



The prosecution has a legitimate interest in discovering all rele-
vant facts to present the strongest possible case at trial and to
meet the defendant's case. Despite that interest, in most jurisdic-
tions the prosecution may discover only the evidence which the de-
fendant intends to present at trial. Even such limited discovery has
been the subject of sharp constitutional attack. The author argues
that far broader prosecutorial discovery is constitutionally permis-
sible. The prosecution should be able to discover all relevant facts
useful in testing defense evidence and any documents or tangible
things (for example, the murder weapon) which strengthen the
prosecution's case if the prosecution could have obtained them by
seizure if it only knew their location.
PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY: LEGITIMACY AND LIMITATIONS
Discovery is a stage in a lawsuit. It normally occurs between the
initial pleadings and the trial or settlement of a case. Discovery may,
however, continue at trial itself.' The purpose of discovery is to af-
ford parties access to all relevant, unprivileged information. It fur-
thers the ascertainment of truth by permitting a party to obtain two
distinct types of information: information that may provide evidence
in support of claims or defenses and information on the claims or
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1. Discovery occurs at trial when the court orders a party to disclose information
which the party does not wish to offer into evidence. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 234-36 (1975) (court ordered defendant to produce at trial prior statement of de-
fense witness).
defenses which an opponent plans to present at trial. The former
type of discovery permits a party to strengthen its case for trial or
settlement purposes, while the latter type of discovery permits a
party to prepare to meet its adversary's case. Both types of discovery
are designed to further the accurate and efficient disposition of
lawsuits.
In civil litigation, absent some claim of privilege, the parties have
no valid interest in denying each other access to facts that can throw
light on the issues in the case. Discovery is particularly important to
private litigants because, prior to the discovery stage of litigation,
they have no means to compel the cooperation of persons who have
knowledge of relevant facts or who possess relevant documents or
things. For this reason, private litigants are unlikely to obtain com-
plete information on the strength of their own case or that of their
opponent until after discovery is obtained. Court rules nevertheless
require a party, or the attorney acting on the party's behalf, to have
a good faith belief in the validity of any claim or defense advanced
when filing a pleading.2 A party must therefore conduct a reasonable
inquiry to ascertain the facts before commencing a lawsuit or filing a
defensive pleading. There" are, however, severe practical limitations
on the investigatory powers of private persons who lack access to
compulsory process. Only the availability of discovery permits pri-
vate parties to gather the information needed to plan intelligently for
trial or settlement.
Do similar considerations favor broad discovery in criminal cases?
Until recently the answer normally given was no. At one time, for-
mal discovery was unavailable in criminal cases because the prosecu-
tion had no need for it and because criminal defendants who did
need it were not sufficiently trustworthy to receive it. Thus, the pros-
ecution gathered its evidence through search and seizure, police in-
terrogation, and grand jury subpoenas, while the defendant remained
in the dark about the prosecution's case until trial. If the defendant
learned before trial the evidence to be introduced by the prosecution,
judges feared that the defendant would present perjured defenses or
intimidate prosecution witnesses.3 Moreover, the other rights of
criminal defendants already tipped the scales of justice too far in the
defendant's favor; and the availability of formal discovery tools
would permit the defendant to further obstruct the prosecution's dif-
ficult task of convicting the guilty.
4
2. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
3. For example, see Chief Justice Vanderbilt's classic attack on discovery by the
criminal defendant in State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884-85 (1953).
4. See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (defendant's
motion to inspect grand jury minutes denied). According to Judge Hand:
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, [the accused] need not
[VOL. 23: 993. 1986] Prosecutorial Discovery
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Fear of these abuses still affects the availability of defense discov-
ery in some jurisdictions. In the federal courts, for example, the
criminal defendant now obtains from the government discovery of
those documents, tangible objects, and reports of experts which the
government intends to use as evidence or which are material to the
preparation of the defense.5 However, the criminal defendant cannot
learn until trial the identity of government witnesses and the sub-
stance of their expected testimony." Moreover, a criminal defendant
may never learn the identity of persons known to the government to
have knowledge of relevant facts if the government decides not to
call them as witnesses.' In 1974 the Supreme Court submitted to
Congress a revised discovery rule which required the government to
make pretrial disclosure of the names, addresses, and criminal
records of its witnesses, subject to the trial court's authority to issue
a protective order to limit or bar such discovery for good cause.8
Congress, largely at the behest of concerned federal prosecutors,9
omitted that provision from the rule it adopted by statute.10
The majority of the states, on the other hand, now extend the ben-
efits of both documentary and witness discovery to criminal defend-
ants." This change in large part is attributable to the influence of
disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or com-
ment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in
the minds of any one of the twelve . . . . Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the
ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays,
and defeats the prosecution of crime.
For rebuttal, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Crimi-
nal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). At least one commentator believes that the
balance of advantage in some states (e.g., California) is now on the defendant's side. Van
Kessel, Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Accommo-
dation or Capitulation, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 855, 899-900 (1977).
5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
7. Of course, due process may require the government to disclose exculpatory
evidence, but the government may not believe the undisclosed witness' testimony to be
exculpatory and the defense may therefore never become aware of what the government
did not disclose. The Supreme Court has also interpreted quite narrowly the govern-
ment's disclosure obligations in United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985), dis-
cussed infra in text accompanying notes 48-50.
8. Proposed FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 62 F.R.D. 271, 304 (1974).
9. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 126-
27 (1977).
10. Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 374 (1975).
11. Roughly 40 states have adopted statutes or court rules providing for defense
discovery, while a handful of others afford criminal defendants common-law discovery. 2
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(b) (1985). Roughly one-half of
the American Bar Association's (ABA) Standards on Discovery and
Procedure Before Trial (Standards on Discovery), which recommend
the full and free discovery of unprivileged information by criminal
defendants.1 2 The drafters of these Standards, whose work the ABA
approved first in 1970 and then in slightly revised form in 1978, ar-
gue that the danger of defense abuse of discovery is present only in a
limited number of cases and that the courts should manage this dan-
ger by enforcing higher standards of attorney conduct'3 and through
protective orders entered on a case-by-case basis.' In all cases where
the prosecution does not obtain a protective order, the defendant
should be able to discover before trial, not only any exculpatory evi-
dence that the federal constitution requires the prosecution to dis-
close, 15 but also evidence of defendant's guilt gathered by the
prosecution.'
6
Despite the liberality of the ABA's approach, the Standards on
Discovery and statutes and court rules based on them still treat de-
fense discovery - and prosecutorial discovery as well, as will be seen
- as basically an interparty affair (that is, an exchange of informa-
tion between the prosecution and the defense). There is very little, if
any, opportunity for discovery from third parties or through deposi-
tion of persons with knowledge of the facts. Discovery in criminal
cases, therefore, functions differently and less generously than dis-
covery in civil cases. The need to bring criminal defendants speedily
to trial precludes the involvement of nonparties in discovery and the
development of the leisurely deposition practice so common in civil
cases.
The growing availability of defense discovery naturally raises the
question of the desirability of prosecutorial discovery. If the defend-
ant has access through discovery to relevant, unprivileged informa-
tion known to the prosecution, should not the prosecution also have
access to relevant, unprivileged information known to the defendant?
In other words, should not criminal discovery be a two-way street?
The prosecution is a party to the litigation and therefore has an in-
the states require the prosecution to disclose the names of its witnesses. Id. § 19.3(0.
12. For the present version of these Standards, see 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, ch. 11 (2d ed. 1980). The Standards originally appeared as STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved Draft 1970).
13. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-1.1(b), at 11-12 (2d ed.
1980) (commentary on 1978 revision). For more extensive commentary accompanying
the original Standards, see STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE
BEFORE TRIAL § 1.2(a) (Approved Draft 1970).
14. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard § 11-4.4 (2d ed. 1980); STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 4.4 (Approved Draft
1970).
15. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
16. See 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-2.1 (2d ed. 1980)
(prosecutorial disclosure).
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terest in learning the relevant facts to prepare for trial. The defend-
ant cannot insist that the prosecution not question or subpoena a per-
son with knowledge of facts on the ground that the person is a
witness for the defense.1" Formal discovery thus furthers the prose-
cution's legitimate interest in obtaining access to all relevant, un-
privileged information.
The ABA and the majority of the states recognize the appropri-
ateness of prosecutorial discovery, but have been far more cautious
in implementing it than in implementing defense discovery. Though
the ABA initially approved prosecutorial discovery of all defense wit-
nesses,18 it subsequently retreated to recommend discovery only of
alibi or mental health witnesses.19 In those areas the prosecution has
a special need to obtain discovery in advance of trial in order to in-
vestigate potentially fabricated defenses. A majority of the states
now require a defendant to give advance notice and to provide dis-
covery if the defendant intends to introduce alibi evidence or to raise
insanity or a related defense.20 However, only fifteen states require
defendants to disclose prior to trial all defense witnesses, and only
ten states require defendants to identify or provide discovery on
other defenses which they intend to raise at trial.2'
The Standards on Discovery and the statutes and rules implement-
ing them view discovery primarily as a means to make criminal trials
fairer and shorter through the avoidance of surprise. As will be seen
more fully below, the emphasis is on the defendant's and, to a lesser
extent, the prosecution's pretrial discovery of the opposing party's
case. The defendant obtains discovery of relevant information that
the prosecution does not intend to use at trial only under the prose-
cutor's due process obligation to disclose material or information
which tends to negate the defendant's guilt or to reduce punish-
ment.22 The prosecution, on the other hand, obtains no discovery of
17. Thus, defense counsel cannot instruct defense witnesses not to talk with the
prosecutor or investigators acting on the prosecutor's behalf. See Van Kessel,
Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Accommodation
or Capitulation, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 855, 887 n.134 (1977) (criticizing as unprece-
dented a California Supreme Court decision hinting to the contrary).
18. STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 3.3
(Approved Draft 1970).
19. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-3.3 (2d ed. 1980).
20. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 11, at § 19.4(b)-(c).
21. See id. § 19.4(e)-(f).
22. For the scope of defense discovery, see 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Standard 11-2.1(c) (2d ed. 1980), and STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PRO-
CEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2.1(c) (Approved Draft 1970). On the inadequacy of relying
upon the prosecutor's constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence as a basis
information that the defendant does not intend to offer as evidence
at trial. This approach thus ignores, or at least deemphasizes, one of
the principal advantages of discovery (that is, the greater accuracy
in fact-finding achievable through affording the parties access to all
relevant information).
The most serious nonconstitutional objection to prosecutorial dis-
covery is that the prosecution does not need it. Unlike private liti-
gants, the state may enforce its informational demands prior to the
commencement of litigation. Indeed, the state should complete its
investigation of a crime before it formally charges the defendant.
The prosecution should not seek a grand jury indictment or file a
criminal information unless convinced that sufficient evidence of
guilt is available to put the deferfdant on trial. Search warrants,
grand jury subpoenas, and the coercive powers of the police to search
and seize without a warrant provide the prosecution with the neces-
sary tools to obtain such evidence.
There are, however, two answers that overcome this objection to
prosecutorial discovery. First, the prosecutor still needs to be aware
of all evidence the defendant intends to present at trial in the way of
defense. Even the most thorough investigation will not uncover
everything known to the defendant or everything the defendant
might present at trial. This prosecutorial ignorance is in part attribu-
table to the privilege against self-incrimination which sharply limits
the questioning of suspects at the precharge stage23 and curtails sub-
poenaing suspects for documents or tangible things.24 Absent pretrial
discovery of the defendant's evidence, the prosecution faces the dan-
ger of surprise at trial.
Second, there is no constitutional bar to the prosecution's
strengthening its case subsequent to bringing a formal charge
against a suspect. At trial, the prosecution must prove all elements
of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. At the earlier
stage of the grand jury indictment or the preliminary hearing -
required in most jurisdictions permitting prosecutions by information
for assuring defense discovery of all relevant information, see infra text accompanying
notes 48-50 & 258-59.
23. If the suspect is in custody, law enforcement authorities must observe the
Miranda litany of warnings and waivers before questioning him. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). In noncustodial situations, there are no similar per se requirements,
but the authorities are well advised to warn suspects (potential defendants) of their right
not to speak to ensure the voluntariness of any incriminating statement. Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976). It is accepted practice (perhaps constitu-
tionally required) to warn a potential defendant subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
24. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (grand jury witness properly
claimed the privilege against self-incrimination in response to subpoena for documents).
See Infra text accompanying notes 34-36 for discussion of the doctrine of testimonial
production.
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- the applicable standard is only probable cause or that of a prima
facie case. Perhaps we should make such screening devices more rig-
orous and require the prosecution to be ready to go to trial once
charges are brought, but there should be no absolute bar to post-
charge discovery efforts by the state to strengthen its case.
In short, postcharge investigation is appropriate for a number of
reasons. The announcement of charges may prompt further disclo-
sures by individuals with knowledge of the facts, or may prompt dis-
closures by persons who did not come forward prior to the filing of
charges. In addition, the prosecution may find it necessary to expand
its case after learning what the defendant plans to present at trial.
The postcharge investigations which pose the most serious threat to
the defendant's right to a fair trial are those investigations which
take place outside the formal discovery process and without the
knowledge of the defense.25 If the prosecution seeks additional infor-
mation through a formal discovery request, the defendant at least
has the opportunity to consult with counsel and to raise in court any
claim of privilege.
Prosecutorial discovery therefore has its own legitimacy. The pros-
ecution, like any other litigant, should be able through discovery to
strengthen its own case and to learn its opponent's case. This Article
largely assumes the desirability of prosecutorial discovery. Rather
than review further the case for or against prosecutorial discovery,
this Article seeks to analyze the constitutional limitations to which
such investigations are subject. These limitations derive primarily
from the privilege against self-incrimination and from the state's ob-
ligation to furnish the defendant due process of law. Some courts
have also found limitations on discovery in the defendant's right to
the effective assistance of counsel, but the basis for such a limitation
is questionable. 28 The attorney-client privilege and the work product
privilege may also limit discovery in particular cases; but those privi-
leges, unlike the privilege against self-incrimination, do not have a
constitutional basis and are thus subject to modification in the dis-
covery context by statutes or court rules.27
25. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (surreptitious placing
of government informant in indicted defendant's jail cell to obtain incriminating state-
ments violated sixth amendment right to counsel).
26. See Mingo v. State, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978). Mingo is discussed
infra at notes 254-55, and analyzed infra in the text accompanying note 247.
27. The existence of a constitutional basis for the attorney-client privilege is a
subject of dispute, but courts have so far declined to constitutionalize the privilege. See
cases cited infra note 244. It is clear that surreptitious intrusions by the prosecution on a
At first glance the privilege against self-incrimination does not ap-
pear to provide an insurmountable obstacle to prosecutorial discov-
ery. The privilege has received in recent years an increasingly nar-
row interpretation by the Supreme Court. The Court no longer seeks
to identify the many "values" or "policies" behind the privilege, 8
but applies it in a more formalistic fashion which, as the Court itself
has recognized, makes the "scope of the privilege" less than "the
complex of values it helps to protect."2 To establish a valid claim of
privilege, the person invoking the privilege must establish that the
disclosures sought by the state satisfy the famous Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia3" trilogy: those disclosures must be compelled, testimonial,
and incriminating. If anyone of the three prongs is missing, there is
no valid claim of privilege.
The Schmerber Court itself held that the compelled production of
a potentially incriminating blood sample did not violate the privilege
because the production was not "testimonial." In two later cases in-
volving prosecutorial discovery, the Court rejected the defendant's
claim of privilege because one of the elements of the Schmerber tril-
ogy was missing. In Williams v. Florida,31 the Court upheld
prosecutorial discovery prior to trial of the names and addresses of
alibi witnesses the defendant intended to call at trial. The Court rea-
soned that Florida's notice of alibi rule did not "compel" any disclo-
sures by the defendant but merely accelerated the timing of the dis-
closures the defendant intended to make at trial. In United States v.
Nobles,32 an unanimous Court upheld prosecutorial discovery of the
prior statement of a defense witness on the ground that the corn-
charged defendant's confidential communications with counsel violate the defendant's
constitutional right to counsel if the prosecution uses the information obtained to the
defendant's detriment at trial. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). But it is
hard to see how there is a violation of the right to counsel if both the defendant and the
attorney realize in advance that certain communications between them are no longer
privileged. "[O]ne can imagine a fair legal system requiring attorneys to disclose in the
courtroom confidential communications imparted by their clients." Saltzburg, Privileges
and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 603 n.14 (1980). In
such a legal system, defendants could receive effective legal assistance even though they
might be less candid in making disclosures to their attorneys. For a contrary argument,
see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 485-87 (1977) (unconstitutional to require defend-
ants to incriminate themselves to obtain the assistance of counsel).
On the absence of any constitutional basis for the work product privilege - a privilege
designed to benefit the attorney and not the client - see Feldman, The Work Product
Rule in Criminal Practice and Procecure, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 495 (1981).
28. For example, see Justice Goldberg's well-known effort to identify at least
seven "policies" behind the privilege in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
29. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966).
30. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
31. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
32. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
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pelled disclosure did not require any testimony by the defendant.
While Nobles involved discovery of the witness' prior statement after
the witness testified at trial, the reasoning of the Court is equally
applicable to pretrial discovery of prior statements of the witnesses
the defendant intends to call at trial. In both situations, the privilege
is "personal to the defendant" and "does not extend to the testimony
or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial.
'33
The present Court's formalistic interpretation of the privilege also
reshapes, to the advantage of the prosecution, the privilege available
to individuals served with a grand jury or other investigatory sub-
poena for the production of documents. In a series of cases culminat-
ing in Fisher v. United States,34 the Court has rejected the tradi-
tional approach, derived from Boyd v. United States,35 which allows
a witness to base a claim of privilege on the incriminating contents
of subpoenaed private papers. The witness must now establish that
the compelled act of production, as distinct from the contents of the
papers, is both testimonial and incriminating. This doctrine of testi-
monial production, grudgingly accepted by Wigmore and other evi-
dence scholars,36 affords the witness less protection than the Court's
traditional approach. The testimony which may accompany the act
of production, and thus afford a possible basis for a claim of privi-
lege, are the producer's implied statements that the documents pro-
duced exist, are in the producer's possession, and are the documents
demanded (that is, they are authentic).
These implied statements seemingly accompany every act of pro-
duction, but Fisher reached the remarkable conclusion that they are
not "sufficiently" testimonial if the prosecution does not need the
producer's testimony. The witness has no claim of privilege if the
prosecution can authenticate the documents by other means and if
the existence and location of the documents are "foregone conclu-
sions."137 Thus, where the act of production "adds little or nothing to
the sum total of the Government's information," 3 the prosecution
may obtain access to the incriminating contents of the witness' pri-
vate papers, which may of course add a great deal to what it knows.
Even if the witness satisfies the testimonial prong, Fisher also re-
quires that the witness establish that the act of production is incrimi-
33. Id. at 234.
34. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
35. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
36. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
37. 425 U.S. at 411.
38. Id.
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nating. It is not enough that the contents of the papers incriminate
the witness; the witness must establish that the fact of their "exis-
tence" or the witness' "possession" of them poses "a realistic threat
of incrimination." 39 Not surprisingly, these elusive criteria have
proved difficult to apply. Only two things are certain: private papers
no longer receive any greater protection from subpoenas than do
chattels such as a gun, and nonproduction is necessarily privileged
only in cases where the possession of the item sought is itself a
crime. It otherwise remains unclear how far the doctrine of testi-
monial production protects an ordinary witness or a criminal defend-
ant from compelled disclosures.
There is, however, a further, potentially more substantial limita-
tion on prosecutorial discovery which derives from the fact that the
state is a very special litigant. When the prosecution invokes the
criminal process to punish an individual, it is not just an ordinary
adversary or party opponent, but it represents the state and is assert-
ing the power of the people to punish individuals for their offenses.
In this situation, the courts have a special responsibility to maintain
a fair state-individual balance and to insure that prosecutorial dis-
covery does not unfairly skew the criminal process in favor of the
state. Any such fundamental unfairness would violate due process.
This concern for fairness also underlies the traditional policies ad-
vanced to justify the privilege. Although the policy underpinning of
the privilege is anything but clear, it is possible to group most of the
arguments advanced in its support under two principal headings: the
maintenance of a fair state-individual balance in the criminal process
and the protection of human dignity.41 The first heading (deprecat-
ingly labeled by Bentham as the "fox hunter's reason") 42 treats the
privilege as an instrument for ensuring that the state and the defend-
ant remain relatively equal adversaries. The state must leave individ-
uals alone until it has good cause to disturb them and then cannot
conscript individuals to defeat themselves. Under this instrumental
approach, the scope of the privilege (that is, what constitutes com-
pulsion) may differ from one setting to another and from one time to
another. 48 The courts must give society as much a dose of the privi-
39. Id. at 412.
40. See Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents - Cutting
Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 489 (1984). Professor Heidt describes the
subpoenas he condemns as "rocking-chair" subpoenas: the prosecutor sits back in a
rocker and demands that the witness produce the stolen goods, narcotics, or other corpus
delicti of the offense under investigation. Id. at 489.
41. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 225; see also O'Brien, The Fifth Amend-
ment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits, and the Burger Court, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW.
26 (1978).
42. 5 J. BENTHAM, A RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 238 (1827).
43. O'Brien, supra note 41, at 40-44.
1002
[VOL. 23: 993. 1986] Prosecutorial Discovery
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
lege as it needs.
The second heading (labeled by Bentham the "old woman's rea-
son") 44 is more normative and absolutist. This policy recognizes that
it is contrary to human dignity to impose certain choices on individu-
als. Compelling persons to choose between deceiving their interroga-
tor, going to jail for their silence, or going to jail for their testimony,
is unfair to the individual. Compelling such a choice is also, as em-
phasized by the first reason, destructive of the adversary system. Co-
ercion produces either false testimony or steamrolled defendants.
The two policies supporting the privilege are thus complimentary.
The Court, whenever it chooses to rely on the policies behind the
privilege, seems to invoke the need to preserve "an adversary system
of criminal justice. '4
5
The courts have so far found little occasion or need to identify
more specific due process limitations on prosecutorial discovery. The
Supreme Court has done no more than to require that criminal dis-
covery be reciprocal.48 Thus, to obtain discovery from the defendant,
the prosecution must afford the defendant reciprocal discovery; but
the Court has done almost nothing to define what it means by reci-
procity. In the only case in which it addressed the issue, the Court
merely held that the prosecution could not obtain discovery of the
defendant's alibi witnesses unless it furnished discovery of its alibi
rebuttal witnesses.47 It remains unclear, even in the context of the
discovery of alibi witnesses, what reciprocal discovery the prosecu-
tion must provide of its own case or of relevant information poten-
tially helpful to the defense.
The scope of the reciprocal discovery available to the defendant is
important for at least two reasons. First, the special interparty na-
ture of criminal discovery requires the defendant to rely exclusively
on the prosecution for pretrial discovery. The defendant has no ac-
cess prior to trial to compulsory process to force disclosures from
third parties. The prosecution usually has pretrial access to third
party information through grand jury or other investigatory subpoe-
nas and by search and seizure. The defendant, on the other hand,
can obtain access during discovery to information controlled by un-
known or recalcitrant third parties only if the prosecution shares
what it already knows.
44. 5 J. BENTHEM, supra note 42, at 230.
45. E.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
46. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
47. Id.
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Second, defendants can no longer rely, if they ever could,48 on the
prosecution's due process obligation to disclose exculpatory informa-
tion to obtain all information useful in presenting a defense. The Su-
preme Court now formulates the prosecutor's obligation, not as one
to disclose exculpatory material, but as an obligation to afford the
defendant a fair trial.49 Suppression of evidence results in constitu-
tional error only if the evidence is material in the sense that its sup-
pression might have affected the outcome of the trial.50 Therefore,
the defendant must rely on discovery rules to obtain not only ad-
vance notice of the prosecution's evidence, but also to learn what
information the prosecution has in its file potentially helpful to pre-
sent a defense.
For both these reasons it is critical to the defense to know what
discovery is obtainable from the prosecution in return for providing
discovery.5 1 The defendant should be permitted to discover, in ex-
change for the broad prosecutorial discovery contemplated in this
Article, more than what the prosecution will disclose at trial in any
case.52 The safe course for the prosecution in facilitating reciprocal
discovery would be to disclose all relevant facts known to it. Need-
less to say, few prosecutors believe it is appropriate to be so
generous.
Jones and Ellis: Two DECISIONS BY JUSTICE TRAYNOR LIMITING
PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY
The case for prosecutorial discovery, as outlined above, is a dual
one: to permit the prosecution to meet the defendant's case, if any,
and to strengthen its own case. Two opinions by Justice Traynor for
the California Supreme Court demonstrate, better than the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, the dual bases for prosecutorial
discovery. The first case, Jones v. Superior Court,53 upheld the pre-
trial discovery of defendant's evidence to permit the prosecution to
better prepare for trial. The second case, People v. Ellis,54 upheld
the pretrial discovery from the defendant of evidence useful to the
prosecution in proving its case where production of the evidence was
48. For an analysis of pre-Bagley law, see Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evi-
dence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Re-
view, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 391 (1984); see also infra text accompanying notes 257-59.
49. United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380 (1985).
50. Id. at 3381.
51. Despite the importance of this question, this Article - which primarily fo-
cuses on limitations on prosecutorial discovery found in the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation - only scratches the surface in addressing it. The only safe conclusion that one
can draw is that it does not appear sufficiently reciprocal for the prosecution to disclose
only its case-in-chief.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 131-37 & 258-59.
53. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
54. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
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nontestimonial.
Both Jones and Ellis represent significant victories for the then
newfangled notion of prosecutorial discovery; 55 but their holdings,
perhaps because of the lack of precedent on which to build, fail to
accord prosecutorial discovery its full scope. Jones allows the prose-
cution to discover only the evidence which the defendant intends to
introduce at trial. The prosecution should be able to discover in addi-
tion whatever information it needs to test the defendant's evidence
through impeachment and rebuttal. Ellis, on the other hand, allows
the prosecution to discover an identifying physical characteristic of
the defendant. The prosecution should be able to discover in addition
specifically described documents or tangible things which it has rea-
son to believe defendants have in their possession or control.
In Jones, a defendant charged with rape obtained a continuance to
gather medical evidence to support a defense of impotency. In his
motion for continuance, the defendant stated that the impotency re-
sulted from an injury which occurred seven or eight years previously.
Quite plainly, the defendant sought to retrieve medical evidence that
predated the lawsuit; he was not seeking to create new medical evi-
dence for litigation purposes. The prosecution thereupon sought dis-
covery of the names, addresses and reports of all physicians who had
treated defendant for the alleged injury. The trial court granted the
prosecutor's request under the system of judicially fashioned discov-
ery then in existence in California. The defendant, prior to trial,
sought a writ of prohibition against the trial court's discovery order.
Justice Traynor for the majority in Jones gave the prosecution
only half a loaf. The court held that the prosecution could discover
the names of medical witnesses the defendant intended to call at
trial, and any medical reports and X-rays defendant intended to in-
troduce in evidence in support of his "affirmative" defense of impo-
tency. The prosecution, however, could not discover the identity of
any treating physician whom defendant did not intend to call at
trial, or any medical report on the injury which defendant did not
intend to introduce in evidence. Thus, to avoid surprise at trial, the
prosecution was permitted to obtain discovery of defendant's evi-
dence (at least with respect to "affirmative defenses" - whatever
they are), but could not obtain discovery of other information known
to the defendant that might assist in rebutting the defense.
55. Traynor was an early and most vigorous champion of discovery in criminal
cases - discovery which he believed should be a two-way street. See Traynor, Ground
Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964).
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Despite its limited holding in favor of the prosecution, the tone of
Justice Traynor's opinion in Jones was very prodiscovery. Traynor
treated discovery as a good thing, finding that it is "designed to as-
certain the truth," ' and argued that the prosecution, as well as the
defense, deserves to share in its benefits. In an often quoted sentence,
Justice Traynor also opined that, "absent the privilege against self-
incrimination or other privileges provided by law, the defendant in a
criminal case has no valid interest in denying the prosecution access
to evidence that can throw light on issues in the case.
' 57
Despite the rhetoric of Jones, its holding and analysis recognized a
major role for the privilege against self-incrimination in limiting
prosecutorial discovery. Pretrial discovery of the witnesses and re-
ports that the defendant intends to present at trial does not violate
the privilege because it requires the defendant to do no more than
disclose a bit earlier "information that he will shortly reveal any-
way."58 The acceleration of these disclosures merely enables the
prosecution "to perform its function at the trial more effectively."5' 9
This "function" is the "cross-examination" of defense witnesses and
the presentation of "effective rebuttal." 60
The court reached a different result on the discoverability of the
treating physicians whom defendant did not intend to call and the
medical reports which defendant did not intend to use as evidence.
The assistance sought from the defendant on these matters was dif-
ferent since the prosecution did not have any "independent evidence"
of the names of these witnesses or the existence of the reports. The
prosecution was seeking "the benefit of. . . [the defendant's] knowl-
edge of the existence of possible witnesses and the existence of possi-
ble reports and x-rays for the purpose of preparing its case against
him." 16 The distinction is between requiring a defendant to lead the
prosecution to new evidence rather than to evidence the defendant
intends to use in presenting a defense. According to Jones, the de-
fendant's privilege bars compelling the former variety of assistance.
The privilege against self-incrimination thus bars the prosecution
from using the defendant's knowledge of relevant information that
the defense does not plan to disclose at trial, even though the infor-
mation itself is not privileged. Thus, the prosecution remains free to
investigate the defendant's prior medical history through third par-
ties. Perhaps the defendant's co-workers, insurance agents, or next
door neighbors could identify the treating physicians. The prosecu-
56. Jones, 58 Cal. 2d at 58, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
57. Id. at 59, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
58. Id. at 62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
59. Id. at 61, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
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tion could then compel such medical witnesses to disclose any rele-
vant information. Once the prosecution learns the identity of a par-
ticular physician, it can obtain by subpoena oral testimony and the
production of any medical records still in the physician's possession.
The defendant's raising of the impotency defense waives any patient-
physician privilege with respect to any communications between the
defendant and the treating phsycians.62
At first blush this explanation of the antidiscovery half of the
Jones holding seems consistent with the two main policies underlying
the privilege. The prosecution should gather evidence to convict
through its own independent efforts (policy of preserving adversarial
system) rather than through using the defendant (policy of protect-
ing human dignity). But matters are not that simple. Why did the
prosecution in Jones seek discovery of all medical evidence and not
just evidence which defendant planned to introduce at trial? Plainly
the prosecution was not seeking evidence of the defendant's potency
in order to convict him of rape. Potency is not an element of rape
which the prosecution must prove. Under California law, the prose-
cution need only prove penetration, however slight.63 The prosecution
normally proves penetration through the testimony of the victim.
Hence, it is difficult to imagine how evidence on potency would assist
the prosecutor in proving penetration. Thus, if the defendant had re-
sponded to the trial court's discovery order by stating that he did not
intend to introduce any evidence, medical or otherwise, on impo-
tency, the prosecution would have had no interest in pursuing its dis-
covery request. The prosecution did not need the evidence to
strengthen its case; and if the defendant did not come forward with
some evidence of impotency, his medical condition would simply not
be in issue at trial.
What the prosecution in Jones obviously feared was that the de-
fendant would present an incomplete if not distorted picture of his
medical condition by disclosing the medical evidence which sup-
ported his defense and withholding that which did not. In other
words, the prosecution opposed the presentation of relevant evidence
when the defendant made only a partial disclosure of what he knew.
Three doctors may have treated the defendant for an injury. The
62. K. BROUN, G. Dix, E. GELLHORN, D. KAYE, R. MEISENHOLDER, E. ROBERTS
& J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 103 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). That section dates from
1872.
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testimony and report of one physician may favor the claim of impo-
tency, while the testimony and report of the other two may be devas-
tating to the defense. The defendant naturally calls the first doctor
as a defense witness, but declines to disclose the names and reports
of the others to the prosecution.
If the prosecution discovers the identity of the undisclosed doctors,
it can use their testimony and reports on rebuttal to discredit the
testimony of the first doctor. Such a rebuttal would surely be more
effective than any cross-examination of defendant's doctor. Simi-
larly, that rebuttal would be more effective than the prosecution's
obtaining a new doctor to perform a pretrial medical examination of
the defendant. The dispute in Jones focused on the effect on the de-
fendant of an injury suffered seven or eight years prior to the rape
charge. A medical examination ordered by the trial court, although
plainly not in violation of the defendant's privilege against self-in-
crimination, would have little weight and certainly lack the probative
force of an examination contemporaneous with the injury.
Thus, the antidiscovery portion of the Jones holding allows the
defendant to suppress potentially effective rebuttal evidence even
though the prosecution lacks alternative means available to test the
evidence presented by the defendant. Perhaps the prosecution will
discover the undisclosed doctors through "independent" investiga-
tion. Resourceful defendants, however, may successfully cover their
tracks by convincing their friends to stay mum. Our concern for a
balanced adversary system supports the discovery and not the sup-
pression of the other doctors and their incriminating reports. Simi-
larly, our concern for human dignity does not prevent compelling de-
fendants from disclosing all they know on a fact in issue when they-
disclose part of what they know in an effort to exonerate themselves.
In Ellis,6 ' unlike in Jones, the now Chief Justice Traynor permit-
ted the prosecution to discover evidence which the defendant had no
intent to use and which the prosecution could use, not to rebut de-
fense evidence, but to strengthen its case-in-chief. The defendant El-
lis allegedly had assaulted a woman with intent to rape. After arrest-
ing Ellis, the police compelled him to participate in a line-up and to
repeat various phrases allegedly uttered by the assailant at the time
of the crime. Ellis refused to participate in the voice identification
procedure. At trial, two police officers testified that defendant Ellis
had refused to speak at the line-up, and the prosecutor commented
adversely on defendant's refusal.
The Ellis court held that the privilege against self-incrimination
does not bar the state from compelling a suspect to supply a poten-
tially incriminating voice exemplar. The privilege should not be read
64. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
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so broadly as to prohibit the state "from demanding assistance of
any kind from an individual in penal proceedings taken against
him."'6 5 Compelling nontestimonial assistance, like the supplying of a
voice exemplar, does not violate the privilege because it does not in-
volve any reliance on the veracity of the defendant. A person's voice,
like one's eyes, hair, or skin, is an observable physical characteristic.
Any attempt by the defendant to disguise his voice is "readily" de-
tectable; and there is "no risk that one could be coerced into falsely
accusing himself." 66
The California Supreme Court relied in part on the United States
Supreme Court's prior ruling6 7 that the privilege against self-incrim-
ination did not bar the state from compelling a suspect to supply a
blood sample. The Court had viewed the coerced participation of the
blood donor as nontestimonial. The Supreme Court subsequently,
without citing Ellis, reached the same result with respect to the
compelling of voice and handwriting exemplars.68 Unlike the Justices
of the Supreme Court, who were content simply to announce that
the compelled production of identifying characteristics did not in-
volve any communication or testimony by the suspect, Chief Justice
Traynor in Ellis sought to reconcile that result with the policies un-
derlying the privilege.
Chief Justice Traynor's analysis focused on the role of the privi-
lege in protecting human dignity and guaranteeing the fair treat-
ment of individuals. According to Traynor, the defendant in Ellis,
when directed to supply a voice exemplar, did not face the same
"psychological pressures" generated by a demand for testimony be-
cause he confronted a more limited number of alternatives.6 9 Since
deceit (that is, disguising one's voice) is improbable, "the simple
choice for a guilty person is between conduct likely to expose incrim-
inating evidence and inferences as to guilt likely to flow from a suc-
cessful refusal to participate. '70 Traynor did not consider unfair the
importance of that choice for a suspect,' 1 particularly in light of the
65. Id. at 534, 421 P.2d at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
66. Id.
67. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
68. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967).
69. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d at 535, 421 P.2d at 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
70. Id.
71. See also Judge Aldrich's holding that compelling a suspect to take dictation
violates the privilege because spelling is an intellectual process requiring choice. United
States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1984). In Campbell, the offender's writings
evidently contained a pattern of misspellings.
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fact that there is no danger that the pressure might cause the sus-
pect falsely to accuse himself. In addition, Traynor argued that the
compelling of voice exemplars was consistent with a fairly balanced
adversary system. Independent identification testimony was "the
very type of objective factual evidence" 72 which the privilege en-
couraged the police to seek. The privilege should not ban identifica-
tion evidence even though obtaining it required some cooperation by
the suspect.
Strictly speaking, Ellis is not a discovery case. The police made
their demand for a voice exemplar during a precharge investigation.
Ellis was under arrest, yet there was no formal criminal proceeding
with parties, pleadings, and discovery.73 Nevertheless, the court's
reasoning applies with equal if not more force to the discovery stage.
In fact, both the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice74 and the Uni-
form Rules of Criminal Procedure (Uniform Rules) adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws75
recommend that the prosecution obtain the production of nontesti-
monial evidence from the defendant through discovery rather than
through police investigatory techniques. Both the Standards on Dis-
covery and the Uniform Rules contain specific provisions authorizing
prosecutorial discovery of the defendant's physical characteristics
such as the defendant's person (for participation in a line-up) or the
defendant's voice exemplar. The compelled production of this evi-
dence, at least in the opinion of the drafters, does not include any
testimony by the defendant.
The drafters of these provisions76 recognize that police have in the
past acquired this evidence during the investigatory stage prior to a
suspect's first appearance in court. While acknowledging that there
is sometimes a need for the police to obtain physical evidence
promptly (for example, any alcohol in an arrestee's blood will soon
disappear), the drafters argue that in most cases the evidence subject
to discovery is not likely to change (for example, the defendant's
physical appearance or voice is unlikely to change over a period of
72. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d at 534, 421 P.2d at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
73. In Ellis, the police had probable cause to believe the defendant Ellis was the
assailant at the time they demanded a voice exemplar. In Dionisio, on the other hand,
the government did not have probable cause to arrest anyone for the offense under inves-
tigation but used the grand jury to obtain voice exemplars from approximately 20 per-
sons. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 3. The Court nevertheless rejected the witness' claim of privi-
lege without recognizing that the witness had a stronger fifth amendment claim not to be
disturbed until the state had more cause than did an arrestee like Ellis or a criminal
defendant.
74. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-3.1 (2d ed. 1980).
75. UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 434, 10 U.L.A. 153 (1974).
76. For reference, see the commentary to Uniform Rule 434 in 10 U.L.A. 154-56
(1974), and the commentary to Standard 11-3.1, 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
11.43-11.50 (2d ed. 1980).
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several weeks). It is therefore preferable for the prosecution to ob-
tain such evidence through discovery in order to shorten or avoid
precharge police detention of the suspect and to provide the neces-
sary judicial authorization for any searches or seizures required to
obtain the evidence.
Most states that permit prosecutorial discovery follow the Stan-
dards on Discovery and the Uniform Rules and authorize discovery
from the defendant of evidence obtainable without compelling any
testimony." Whether this change reduces the incidence of detention
to obtain such evidence or increases the level of judicial involvement
in the process is uncertain; but at least the prosecution need not fear
that defendants are no longer available as a source of identifying or
physical evidence once they appear in court and make bail.
The utility of this form of discovery to the prosecution depends of
course on the definition of "nontestimonial." Both the Standards on
Discovery and the Uniform Rules equate nontestimonial production
with the production of identifying or physical evidence from the de-
fendant's person. Standard 11-3.1(c), for example, authorizes the
court to order the defendant to appear in a line-up, try on clothing or
other articles, permit the taking of specimens of blood, urine or other
materials on or from the body, submit to a reasonable physical or
medical inspection, or participate in other procedures for obtaining
nontestimonial evidence.78 The court must find that the evidence
sought is relevant, that the procedure for obtaining it does not in-
volve an unreasonable intrusion of the body or an unreasonable af-
front to the dignity of the individual, and that the request is reasona-
ble.79 Despite the catchall phrase "participate in other procedures,"
it is plain that the drafters did not intend to permit the prosecution
to discover tangible things, such as weapons or items of clothing. The
drafters plainly intended to limit the prosecution to the discovery of
information "about the person of the accused."80 Since the tangible
things listed above are no more testimonial, as that word is normally
understood, than the defendant's blood or voice, it is not readily ap-
parent why they should not also be discoverable.
This limitation of prosecutorial discovery to identifying or physical
evidence from the defendant's person reflects present law. Common-
77. See, e.g., MD. R. 4-263.
78. UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 434(c) contains a very similar but somewhat lengthier list
of identification evidence obtainable from the defendant. 10 U.L.A. 158 (1974).
79. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-3.1(b) (2d ed. 1980).
80. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11.43 (commentary on Standard 11-
3.1) (2d ed. 1980)).
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wealth v. Hughes81 is the lead opinion. In Hughes, Massachusetts
charged defendant with two counts of assault with a dangerous
weapon. The assault involved firing two rounds of ammunition
through the front windshield of a truck in which the victims were
sitting. Prior to trial, the prosecution obtained a court order compel-
ling defendant to produce a revolver (designated by serial number)
registered in his name. The defendant refused to comply with the
order, and the trial court subsequently held him in contempt. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the contempt
conviction on the ground that the defendant had validly claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Kaplan's reasoning, as
will be seen, focused not on any testimonial qualities of the gun but
on the testimonial aspects of the compelled production.
No privilege attached to the revolver itself, and the prosecution
could have seized it under a warrant if it knew where the revolver
was. The shooting charge provided probable cause to seize as evi-
dence any revolver registered to the defendant; and the police could
search for it in the defendant's home or wherever else they could
convince a magistrate there was an adequate basis for believing they
might find it.82 Indeed, the police had obtained a warrant to search
the defendant's car for the revolver, but the search had proved fruit-
less. Finally, if the defendant had shown the gun to the prosecutor in
the courtroom corridor with the taunting remarks "Here is my regis-
tered gun but you cannot have it," the prosecutor could have imme-
diately seized the weapon. In this hypothetical scenario, the prosecu-
tor's observations would be sufficient probable cause to effecuate, a
warrantless plain view seizure.83 Moreover, the seizure itself would
not violate the defendant's privilege because the defendant did not
participate in the seizure but merely submitted to it. Since the prose-
cutor did not require the defendant to do anything, there was no
"compulsion.'
The prosecution's dilemma in Hughes was that it did not know
whether the weapon still existed or what the defendant had done
with it in the year that had transpired since the alleged offense. All
the prosecution knew was that the defendant purchased and regis-
tered the revolver on March 23, 1976 - roughly twenty-seven
81. 380 Mass. 583, 404 N.E.2d 1239 (1980).
82. A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched as well
as the things to be seized. The probable cause requirement applies both to the seizability
of the thing and its location in the place to be searched. Where the police have probable
cause to believe a particular individual committed a crime and possesses somewhere par-
ticular items of incriminating evidence, courts have been fairly liberal in upholding war-
rants to search the defendant's home or other places with which the defendant has con-
tinuous contact. Commonwealth v. DeMasi, 362 Mass. 53, 283 N.E.2d 845 (1972).
83. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
84. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1977).
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months before the alleged assault - and had not filed any report for
the transfer of the gun. According to Justice Kaplan, the prosecu-
tion, in demanding the production of the gun, was "seeking to be
relieved of its ignorance or uncertainty by trying to get itself in-
formed of knowledge the defendant possesses." 8 The defendant, by
producing the weapon, would be making a statement about the gun's
present "existence" and about his "possession" of it. The statement
implied from the act of production would also serve to authenticate
the gun produced as the gun sought by the court order (that is, the
gun registered to the defendant).
The court found that these implied statements conveyed to the
prosecution "new knowledge" and were thus testimonial under
Fisher v. United States,86 the leading case applying the Schmerber
trilogy to claims of privilege by the recipients of subpoenas for docu-
ments. In addition, "the avowals" sought from the defendant were
"incriminating" because the prosecution intended to run ballistic
tests on the gun, which might lead to expert testimony "tying the
revolver to the actual assault. 18 7 The defendant therefore had a valid
claim of privilege because the court order directing him to produce
the gun sought to compel (the compulsion prong) implied statements
(the testimonial prong) which might result in a positive ballistic test
(the incrimination prong).
Hughes certainly represents the majority approach in condemning
subpoenas for incriminating tangible evidence.88 Indeed, the law is so
clear that few prosecutors bother to seek subpoenas or court orders
compelling a defendant to produce documents or tangible items that
might strengthen the prosecution's case. There is nevertheless, as ar-
gued by Judge Friendly, a "reek of the oil lamp" in the doctrine of
testimonial production 9 applied in Hughes and Fisher. In Hughes,
the prosecution wanted the gun to conduct a ballistic test. It had a
85. Hughes, 380 Mass. at 592, 404 N.E.2d at 1244 (quoting People ex rel. Bow-
man v. Woodward, 63 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 349 N.E.2d 57, 60 (1976)).
86. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
87. Hughes, 380 Mass. at 593, 404 N.E.2d at 1245.
88. See State v. Alexander, 281 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1979); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 466 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Goldsmith v. Superior
Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d 76, 199 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1984). But see United States v.
Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) (production of passport by defendant compella-
ble). See also United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1979). For a discus-
sion of Authement, see infra note 300.
89. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 702 (1968).
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right of "lawful access" to the incriminating contents of the gun.90
The defendant had no right to deny the prosecution that access, and,
if the police discovered the gun in plain view or while searching for it
under a warrant, the defendant could not forcibly prevent its seizure.
The prosecution had little interest or need for any implied state-
ments by the defendant that would accompany the act of production.
The serial number and registration documents provided a ready basis
for authenticating the gun without the defendant's help. No doubt
an admission by the defendant that the gun still existed and that he
still possessed it sometime after the alleged crime might have some
relevance in establishing the defendant's guilt; but the prosecution
had no real need for that evidence to prove its case. The absence of
any transfer report already provided some evidence of the defend-
ant's continuing possession of the gun, which is not an element of the
offense charged in any case.
The incriminating evidence really sought by the prosecution was a
ballistic test connecting the gun with the crime. The Hughes court
mistakenly treated the danger that the test results might incriminate
the defendant as satisfying the incrimination prong for a valid claim
of privilege. In the court's language, the defendant's production of
the gun would furnish "a link in the chain of evidence" leading the
prosecution to the incriminating ballistic test.9 1 This analysis is in-
consistent with Supreme Court cases on investigatory subpoenas for
documents in which the Court has made it clear that the incrimina-
tory contents of documents do not provide any basis for a claim of
privilege. Thus, the Court in Fisher found that there was no incrimi-
nation in the taxpayer's compelled production of his accountant's pa-
pers. The Court reasoned that there was nothing illegal or even sus-
picious about a taxpayer consulting an accountant concerning his tax
liability and accepting delivery of the accountant's work papers.
92
The Court did not inquire whether the contents of the papers might
assist the government to convict the taxpayer of criminal tax fraud.
Surely the government believed that the papers would so incriminate
the taxpayer or it would not have sought their production. Thus, in
Hughes, as in Fisher, the incriminating testimony must be found in
the implied statements as to existence, possession and authenticity
that accompany the act of production.
The defendant's admission that he possessed a gun a year after the
date of the alleged shooting (the contempt adjudication occurred
90. The phrase is Chief Judge Coffin's from an opinion making an argument simi-
lar to that found in the text. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1056 (1st
Cir. 1980).
91. Hughes, 380 Mass. at 593, 404 N.E.2d at 1245 (quoting Maness v. Meyers,
419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975)).
92. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412.
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about a year later) may conceivably incriminate the defendant once
the prosecution links the gun to the crime through a ballistic test or
other evidence. The defendant's implied statement may therefore
strengthen the prosecution's case, although the prosecution would
happily forgo using the defendant's "avowals" if a grailt of use im-
munity would suffice to obtain the evidence the prosecution really
wanted - an incriminating ballistic test. As the grant of use immu-
nity needed to compel the testimonial production of documents need
not extend to the contents of the documents, 3 the grant of immunity
needed to compel the production of the gun should not affect the
prosecutor's use of the ballistic test itself. The gun, like the docu-
ments themselves, should remain fully available to the prosecution as
evidence.
The availability of use immunity only highlights the threshold
question: what purposes behind the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion support treating as testimonial and privileged the production of
a gun, but as nontestimonial and unprivileged the production of
blood, a voice exemplar, or other physical evidence connected with
the defendant's person? Given the prosecution's right of access to the
gun (that is, the prosecution had probable cause to seize it as evi-
dence of crime), it is difficult to see how compelling the defendant to
make it accessible to the prosecution adversely impacts a fair state-
individual balance or violates human dignity any more than compel-
ling the defendant to supply a blood or voice sample. The defendant
has no right (constitutional or otherwise) to destroy the gun;"' and
the prosecution has a valid interest in using the gun to convict the
defendant if it could obtain that evidence without compelling any
testimony from the defendant.
Of course, a defendant compelled to produce a gun faces a greater
range of alternatives than a defendant compelled to produce blood or
a voice exemplar. In particular, the opportunities for perjury are
greater, as the defendant may be tempted falsely to deny continuing
possession of the gun. In cases such as Hughes, a denial of present
possession arguably poses an additional danger of incrimination be-
cause Massachusetts law punishes a gun registrant who transfers the
93. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 n.17 (1984).
94. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 816 (1984) (no constitutional right to
destroy evidence). In many jurisdictions efforts by a suspect or defendant to conceal or
destroy incriminating evidence may be admissible as evidence reflecting consciousness of
guilt and may even constitute an obstruction of justice. See People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d
328, 359 P.2d 433, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961).
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gun without reporting the transfer. 95 On the other hand, there is lit-
tle danger of false accusation in the case either of the gun or the
voice exemplar. With respect to the voice exemplar, the defendant's
implied statement that "this is my voice" is not testimonial because,
in the Court's words, it is "self-evident" and adds no information to
the prosecution's case. 96 Once the prosecution has the gun, the same
is true with respect to the defendant's implied statement "this is my
gun." The serial number on the gun provides a ready means of au-
thentication which justifies treating the defendant's admission as a
foregone conclusion. The same cannot be said of the defendant's im-
plied statements on the gun's existence and the defendant's posses-
sion of it; but, as will be seen below, discovery rules can provide the
defendant a safe mechanism for producing through counsel docu-
ments or tangible things to which the prosecution has a right of legal
access. The rules could minimize, if not eliminate, any testimony by
defendants and thus harmonize the prosecution's right of legal access
with the defendants' right not to have the testimonial implications of
their submissions used against them.97
THE CASE FOR BROADER PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY
OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE
Discovery of Evidence the Defendant Intends to Introduce at Trial
Before arguing that Jones incorrectly limited prosecutorial discov-
ery, it is necessary to defend the half of the Jones holding which
upheld the prosecution's discovery of evidence that the defendant in-
tended to introduce to support the affirmative defense of impotency.
That holding also presents some difficulties recognized, in particular,
by the court's peculiar reference to impotency as an "affirmative"
defense.
Impotency is surely not an affirmative defense under the standard
definition.98 In introducing evidence of impotency, the defendant
seeks to raise a reasonable doubt on one of the elements of rape
95. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 269, § 10(h), 140, § 129C (West 1974). The
registrant's nonpossession does not establish by itself an offense because the registrant
may have discarded or destroyed the gun (for which he need not file a report) rather
than have transferred it.
96. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. The Court made its point by referring to a handwrit-
ing exemplar.
97. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1056 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin,
C.J.) (finding a need to harmonize but suggesting no solution).
98. The term "affirmative defense" generally refers to defenses on which the de-
fendant has the burden of coming forward with some evidence in order to interject the
defense into the case. Once the defendant satisfies that burden, the court must instruct
the jury on the defense and, if the defense negates an element of the crime, the prosecu-
tion must establish that element (e.g., the lack of justification for a killing) beyond a
reasonable doubt. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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(penetration). The evidence therefore denies the prosecution's case
rather than supports an affirmative defense. 9 What the Jones court
must have had in mind was that impotency was the type of defense
where it was difficult to imagine how the defendant's evidence could
help the prosecution prove the elements of the offense.190 Thus, in
limiting prosecutorial discovery, at least initially, to affirmative de-
fenses, the court implicitly recognized the difficulty posed by defense
evidence that could help the prosecution prove its case-in-chief. The
California Supreme Court's subsequent highlighting of that difficulty
contributed to its ultimate rejection of prosecutorial discovery.
The favorable reception given elsewhere to the prodiscovery por-
tion of the Jones holding did not include any mention of the affirma-
tive defense limitation. The Supreme Court in Williams v. Flor-
ida,101 for example, adopted Justice Traynor's acceleration rationale
when it upheld a notice of alibi statute. As the statute only required
defendants to disclose prior to trial the names and addresses of the
alibi witnesses they intended to call at trial, it did not, according to
the Court, "compel" any disclosures but only "accelerated" the tim-
ing of the disclosures defendants chose to make. The statute there-
fore did not compel defendants to incriminate themselves in violation
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.0 2
Justice Black, in his Williams dissent,10 3 recognized, as have the
commentators, 0 that an alibi is not an affirmative defense in the
sense Justice Traynor used that phrase because an alibi witness ne-
99. Alibi evidence is also denial evidence which the defendant introduces to raise
a reasonable doubt about criminal agency. It is still possible to call an alibi an affirmative
defense because the defendant must come forward with some evidence of alibi to obtain
an instruction informing the jury that it must acquit if the alibi evidence raises a reason-
able doubt about the defendant's guilt. Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 486 A.2d 196
(1985). There is no authority for the granting of an analogous instruction on the effect of
a rape defendant's alleged impotency. A defendant suffering from impotency may still be
able to achieve the necessary penetration, and emission is not required for the crime. W.
CLARK & W. MARSHALL, CRIMES 762 (7th ed. 1967).
100. The commentators have so interpreted Traynor's reference to affirmative de-
fenses. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor Con-
fronts the Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 89, 92 n.18 (1965); Nakell, Criminal Discovery
for the Defense and the Prosecution: The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50
N.C.L. REV. 437, 497-98 (1972).
101. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
102. Id. at 85.
103. Id. at 110 (Black, J., dissenting).
104. Nakell, supra note 100, at 500-02; Allis, Limitations on Prosecutorial Dis-
covery of the Defense Case in Federal Courts: The Shield of Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL.
L. REV. 461, 464 (1977). Arguably, even defense evidence of impotency may conceivably
contribute to the prosecution's case. See Prosecution's Right to Discovery, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 225, 228 (1971) (remediable psychological impotency).
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cessarily has some knowledge of the defendant and his activities and
may supply the prosecution with information or leads that could
place the defendant at the scene of the crime. The majority did not
respond to this difficulty, perhaps because no such information sur-
faced after the defendant in Williams had complied with the statute
and had disclosed the name and address of his alibi witness. The
prosecutor then used that information to obtain both impeachment'0 5
and rebuttal 06 evidence that effectively destroyed the defendant's al-
ibi. There is nothing in the majority opinion, however, to indicate
that the Court would have reached a different result if the disclosed
alibi witness had led the prosecutor to another "friend" of the de-
fendant who placed him at the crime scene.
The Williams Court did recognize that the defendant's disclosures
under the notice of alibi statute were potentially incriminating even
if they did not provide the prosecution with additional evidence plac-
ing defendant at the scene of the crime.10 7 Evidence is incriminating
if it assists the prosecution in convicting the defendant of a crime."0 8
The defendant's disclosures helped the prosecution to convict the de-
fendant by permitting the prosecution to destroy the defendant's al-
ibi. The Court reasoned that this incriminating use of the disclosures
was permissible because the defendant's disclosure of the alibi wit-
ness at trial could have also helped the prosecution to convict. The
prosecutor's cross-examination of the alibi witness could have uncov-
ered "incriminating rebuttal evidence,"' 0 ' 'or the prosecution could
have obtained a continuance to do the investigation necessary to re-
105. The prosecutor deposed the alibi witness prior to trial and used that deposi-
tion to impeach her trial testimony. Williams, 399 U.S. at 81.
106. The prosecutor's investigation obtained evidence that the alibi witness was
elsewhere than with the defendant at the time of the crime. Id.
107. "However 'testimonial' or 'incriminating' the alibi defense proves to be it can-
not be considered compelled . . . ." Id. at 84.
108. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, § 121(a); Lushing, Testimonial
Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Study in Isomorphism, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1690, 1707-08 (1982). Thus, evidence admissible for the pros-
ecution only to rebut a defense may incriminate the defendant. United States v. Byers,
740 F.2d 1104, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (insanity defense). While there is
surprisingly little federal constitutional authority for this point, it seems to be self-evi-
dent. Rebuttal evidence increases the 'likelihood of the defendant's conviction. Evidence
rebutting an alibi, for example, both strengthens the prosecution's evidence of the de-
fendant's presence at the crime scene and undermines the defendant's effort to raise a
reasonable doubt on absence. Evidence admissible only to impeach a defense witness also
may incriminate a defendant, although the only direct authority for that proposition in-
volves evidence used to impeach a testifying defendant's credibility. See New Jersey v.
Potash, 440 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1979) (defendant's prior immunized testimony not admis-
sible to impeach defendant's credibility; such an incriminating use prohibited by grant of
immunity). For a clear state constitutional holding that impeachment or rebuttal evi-
dence eviscerating a defense "incriminates" the defendant, see In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d
543, 558, 698 P.2d 637, 647, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 579 (1985).
109. Williams, 399 U.S. at 83-84.
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but the defense.110 Therefore, the "pressures" generated by the
state's evidence, which may cause the defendant to present an "in-
criminating" defense, are similar at the trial and pretrial stages.111
In neither situation does the state compel the defendant to incrimi-
nate himself by presenting defense evidence.
The pretrial investigation is likely to be more thorough than a
midtrial investigation and is, therefore, a substantial advantage to
the prosecution. The Williams Court did not deny that fact and in-
deed emphasized it by describing the thorough and effective pretrial
investigation actually conducted by the prosecutor in that case. Ac-
cording to the Court, the prosecutor's success demonstrated the legit-
imacy of prosecutorial discovery because both the prosecution and
the defendant have a strong interest in having "an ample opportu-
nity" to investigate the facts in dispute.112 Another way to make the
same point might be to say that there is no danger of incrimination
if a disclosure only permits the prosecution to present more effec-
tively evidence to which it already has lawful access. 1 3 The privilege
does not protect the defendant from the prosecutor's efforts to be as
well prepared for trial as possible.
At least fifteen states have followed Jones and Williams in author-
izing pretrial discovery by the prosecution of all the defendant's evi-
dence.11 4 In these states, the prosecutor may discover the names of
the witnesses the defendant intends to call and any documentary evi-
dence (including reports of experts) or tangible things the defendant
intends to present at trial. In a substantial number of additional
states the prosecution may discover documents and tangible things,
but not the identity of defense witnesses.11 5 These discovery rules are
of course subject to applicable constitutional limitations (the rules
usually say so explicitly); and courts have generally interpreted
them, even when their language is unclear, to permit discovery only
of what defendants intend to disclose at trial.116
110. Id. at 85.
111. Id. at 84.
112. Id. at 82.
113. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, § 121(a), at 292 (no incrimi-
nation if disclosure leads to the admissibility of evidence allegedly unlawfully seized).
114. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.4(0, at 748 (1985).
115. Id. § 19.4(h), at 750 (includes all states with general criminal discovery
rules).
116. People ex reL. Bowman v. Woodward, 63 Ill. 2d 382, 349 N.E.2d 57 (1976);
State v. Melvins, 155 N.J. Super. 316, 382 A.2d 925 (1978); People v. District Court,
187 Colo. 333, 537 P.2d 626 (1975); State v. Gallegos, 92 N.M. 370, 588 P.2d 1045
(1978).
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The Alaska Supreme Court is the only court that follows the pre-
sent approach of the California Supreme Court in rejecting alto-
gether prosecutorial discovery of defense evidence. 117 The ABA,
however, in its 1978 revision of the Standards on Discovery, did limit
prosecutorial discovery of defense witnesses to alibi and mental con-
dition witnesses - witnesses whom the prosecutor had a special need
to discover before trial.1 8
The California Supreme Court not only has rejected Jones but has
barred all prosecutorial discovery. Two major themes run through
that court's post-Jones discovery decisions. First, the privilege
against self-incrimination precludes most if not all pretrial discovery
of the defendant's evidence because disclosures may assist the prose-
cution to prove guilt. Because the Supreme Court in Williams
adopted a less restrictive interpretation of the federal privilege
against self-incrimination (finding only acceleration and not compul-
sion), the California Supreme Court turned to the state constitution
as the basis for its rulings. Second, trial courts should not implement
prosecutorial discovery on a case-by-case basis through judicially
fashioned discovery orders. Prosecutorial discovery must await a
comprehensive set of discovery rules specifying what discovery is
available to both parties. 1'
The lead California decision rejecting Jones is Prudhomme v. Su-
perior Court.120 The Prudhomme court argued that the timing of the
defendant's disclosure of evidence may make a difference because a
pretrial disclosure "conceivably might lighten the prosecution's bur-
den of proving its case in chief."'' For example, a murder defend-
ant's disclosure of a self-defense witness at trial by calling the wit-
ness to the stand permits the prosecution to gather impeachment or
rebuttal evidence but does not permit the prosecution to use that wit-
ness to prove its case-in-chief. Pretrial disclosure of the witness, on
the other hand, might result in the witness' testifying for the prose-
cution to establish the actus reus of the offense charged (the defend-
117. Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
118. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-3.3 (1980). The prosecu-
tion can still discover prior to trial the reports (and thus the identities) of any experts
who will testify for the defendant. Id. at Standard 11-3.2. For the earlier standard ap-
proving prosecutorial discovery of all defense witnesses, see STANDARDS RELATING TO
DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 2-6 (Approved Draft 1970).
119. Because the California Supreme Court did not have authority to promulgate
court rules for discovery, and.because the legislature had declined to do so by statute, the
court concluded that prosecutorial discovery must await legislative action. Although the
California Supreme Court's interpretation of the privilege does not appear to be correct,
the court is on sounder ground in concluding that a comprehensive set of court rules is a
prerequisite for ensuring fair, reciprocal discovery.
120. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
121. Id. at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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ant's killing of the deceased). 122 The Prudhomme court concluded
that the criminal defendant should have the same right as "an ordi-
nary witness to show that disclosure of particular information could
incriminate.' 12 3 Therefore, the prosecution could not obtain the dis-
covery of the names, addresses and expected testimony of defense
witnesses unless it "clearly appear[ed]" that the disclosures could
not possibly incriminate the defendant by providing an essential link
in a chain of evidence underlying the prosecution's case-in-chief.
112
Prudhomme's holding surely would have surprised Justice Tray-
nor, who had assumed in Jones that the privilege applicable to pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases was the broader criminal defend-
ant's privilege and that the defendant need not show any danger of
incrimination. 25 For Traynor, prosecutorial discovery was constitu-
tional, not because there was no incrimination, but because there
was no compulsion. While Prudhomme did not address the accelera-
tion rationale, its defenders might respond that there is "compul-
sion" at the pretrial stage if there is present a risk of incrimination
which is no longer present when the defendant voluntarily discloses
evidence at trial.
Prudhomme's condemnation of pretrial disclosures as "incriminat-
ing" effectively ended prosecutorial discovery in California. Califor-
nia judges proved to have fertile imaginations by finding it easy to
conceive how defense disclosures prior to trial might help the prose-
cution prove its case. In Allen v. Superior Court, 26 the court, basing
its holding on state constitutional grounds, struck down a trial court
order requiring the defendant to disclose the names of defense wit-
nesses on voir dire. Although the trial judge ordered the prosecution
not to contact the defendant's witness prior to trial, the California
Supreme Court nonetheless still speculated that the disclosures
might incriminate the defendant because the prosecution could use
the names to anticipate possible defenses (for example, the listing of
friends or relatives as defense witnesses suggests an alibi defense, the
listing of police officers suggests an entrapment defense). 27 The dis-
sent cogently argued that the list of names gave the prosecution only




125. Jones, 58 Cal. 2d at 60, 372 P.2d at 920-21, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
126. 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1976).
127. Id. at 526 n.4, 557 P.2d at 68 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 777 n.4.
128. Id. at 531, 557 P.2d at 71, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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might add, on which the prosecution would be ill-advised to rely),
and complained that under the majority's approach "any free-float-
ing hypothetical risk [of incrimination], no matter how remote, how
tenuously related to the facts of the particular case, will bar all
prosecutorial discovery."
1 29
In People v. Collie130 the court took the next logical step and
barred all prosecutorial discovery absent specific legislative authori-
zation. Collie is a wise decision given the peculiar situation of the
California Supreme Court. Neither the California Constitution nor
any California statute authorizes the supreme court to promulgate
court rules governing practice and procedure. Trial courts have
therefore ordered both prosecutorial and defense discovery on a case-
by-case basis. Such a system is a questionable way to assure the de-
fendant reciprocal discovery required by due process.
In Wardius v. Oregon,'3' the United States Supreme Court held
that a state could not require a defendant to disclose an alibi defense
prior to trial unless the defendant had "fair notice that he would
have an opportunity to discover the State's rebuttal witnesses.'
13 2
The aspect of reciprocal discovery emphasized in Wardius was de-
fense discovery of the prosecution's rebuttal witnesses. By the same
token, it also seems unfair to expect the defendant to disclose alibi
witnesses unless the prosecution first states the time and place of the
alleged crime, 3 3 Likewise, as argued by Justice Peters in his Jones
dissent, the prosecution should not be permitted simply to demand
that the defendant disclose what defenses he intends to raise and
what evidence he intends to produce in support of a defense. 34 Fair-
ness requires that a defendant have adequate discovery of the prose-
cution's evidence before choosing what evidence, if any, to present.
Although Wardius did not analyze reciprocity so broadly, the accel-
eration rationale requires that a defendant have roughly the same
knowledge of the state's case when making a pretrial choice to pre-
sent evidence as when making the same choice at trial. 3 5 Although
129. Id. at 532, 557 P.2d at 71, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
130. 30 Cal. 3d 43, 634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981).
131. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
132. Id. at 479.
133. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (defendant's alibi disclosure obligations triggered
by "written demand of the attorney for the government stating time, place, and date of
alleged offense").
134. Jones, 58 Cal. 2d at 62, 372 P.2d at 925, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 882-83 (Peters, J.,
dissenting). In Jones, the prosecution fortuitously learned the nature of the defendant's
defense when the defendant sought a continuance to gather evidence of his impotency.
135. Wardius defined the defendant's reciprocal discovery as discovery of the
state's rebuttal evidence. That definition may be appropriate for an alibi defense. It is
fair to expect a defendant to choose an alibi defense without knowing the prosecution's
entire case - at least if the defendant knows the time and place of the alleged offense.
With respect to defense evidence other than alibi evidence (e.g., evidence of self-defense,
duress, mistake), it would seem that the defendant must receive more information about
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it may be possible to achieve reciprocity without formal discovery
rules, the California Supreme Court concluded that the task of mon-
itoring discovery orders fashioned by trial judges on a case-by-case
basis was too burdensome and did not give the defendant sufficient
assurance of reciprocal treatment. 136 That judgment appears to be
sound. The chances of achieving a fair system of reciprocal discovery
are greater if defendants, before they must furnish discovery, receive
from court rules the necessary "fair notice"' 37 on the discovery avail-
able to them.
On the other hand, the California Supreme Court's distinction be-
tween different prosecutorial uses of defense evidence - the distinc-
tion between using the evidence to prove the prosecution's case-in-
chief as opposed to using it to impeach or rebut defendant's case -
appears to be unsound. First of all, as argued above, both uses are
incriminating uses.138 Second, there are no sharp temporal limita-
tions on the prosecution's case-in-chief. While that term normally
refers to the evidence presented by the prosecution prior to the de-
fendant's case, the trial judge has discretion to vary the conventional
order of proof and to allow the prosecution to reopen its case after
the defendant has rested. The prosecution may then present addi-
tional evidence, even though that evidence is not admissible as rebut-
tal evidence. 13 9 At that point, the prosecution will have received any
benefit obtainable from hearing the defendant's evidence. Third,
common sense tells us that it is a rare occurrence when the defend-
ant's evidence (the evidence the defendant presents to exculpate him-
self) really will help the prosecution prove its case-in-chief. If that
were not so, the defendant would be at a real disadvantage at a re-
trial following an appellate reversal of an earlier conviction. The
United States Supreme Court has not even mentioned that disadvan-
tage when discussing the permissibility of a retrial, although the
Court has barred a retrial if the reversal was for insufficient evi-
dence.140 Fourth, and most importantly, even in the exceptional case
the prosecution's case before he can choose intelligently what evidence to present in
defense.
136. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 847, 528 P.2d 45, 53-54, 117
Cal. Rptr. 437, 445-46 (1974) (no prosecutorial discovery of alibi evidence without legis-
lative action). Collie extended Reynolds to preclude all prosecutorial discovery absent
legislative action.
137. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 479.
138. See supra note 108.
139. Mays v. State, 283 Md. 548, 391 A.2d 429 (1978); 6 J. WiGMORE, supra note
36, § 1867.
140. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
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where the defense witness may help the prosecution prove an ele-
ment of the offense, the incriminating consequences of pretrial dis-
closure are analogous to those of disclosure at trial. 4'
As Justice White recognized in Williams, presenting a defense
may prove to be incriminating. 42 The jury will decide whether the
defendant is guilty by considering all of the evidence and not just the
prosecution's evidence.' 43 Judges, in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, will review all the evidence of guilt
and not just the evidence introduced by the prosecution.'" The pros-
ecution may use to convict a defendant incriminating evidence
presented at trial by the defendant.
The defendant thus faces the same risk of incrimination at trial as
before trial when deciding to call and thus disclose a defense witness.
In both cases, the witness may incriminate the defendant. The de-
fendant must choose between the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to present wit-
nesses, including one's self, in one's own defense. Although the Su-
preme Court in Simmons v. United States 45 held that the state
could not require a criminal defendant to surrender one constitu-
tional right (there the fifth amendment privilege) to invoke another
(the fourth amendment right to exclude unconstitutionally seized ev-
idence), that holding has inspired no progeny. The Court seemingly
abandoned it in McGautha v. California'46 and now employs a bal-
ancing test to evaluate choices required of criminal defendants.
1 47
That approach permits consideration of state interests in requiring
an election and the effect such an election has on the constitutional
rights at stake. The compelled election is constitutional if it does not
141. A hypothetical best illustrates this last point. Take the case of the self-defense
witness in a murder prosecution who is also of course a witness to the homicide. Let us
assume that the prosecutor does not discover the witness' identity until the defendant
calls the witness at trial. The witness' testimony may be very convincing on the defend-
ant's killing the deceased but very shaky on the claim of self-defense. Is not the prosecu-
tion free to argue that the fact-finder should believe the first part of the witness' testi-
mony but not the second part? A self-defense witness necessarily incriminates the
defendant on the actus reus of the killing; that incrimination may prove fatal to the
defendant if the jury does not believe the witness' testimony on self-defense. Defendants
accept this risk when they decide to call a self-defense witness.
142. Williams, 399 U.S. at 83-84.
143. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846-47 (1973).
144. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
145. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
146. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). In McGautha, Justice Harlan, who had also written
Simmons, retreated from the earlier approach. He did not question the soundness of the
result in Simmons, but he did indicate that, "to the extent that . . . [the Simmons]
rationale was based on a 'tension' between constitutional rights . . ., the validity of that
reasoning must now be regarded as open to question." Id. at 212.
147. See Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on
the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IoWA L. REV. 741 (1981).
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violate the policies behind the rights at stake.
148
The election required of a defendant who wishes to present evi-
dence should easily pass constitutional muster. In fact, it has never
really been considered vulnerable to challenge. It is a long-accepted
and reasonable condition on the right to present a defense that the
prosecution may not only seek to impeach or rebut the defendant's
evidence, but may also use it to secure a conviction.149 The state has
a strong interest in fully testing a defendant's evidence and in ob-
taining a jury verdict based on all the evidence in the trial record.
That interest justifies compelling a defendant to choose between
presenting no evidence and presenting evidence which the prosecu-
tion may use to incriminate.
As to the effect on the defendant's rights, this election imposes a
lesser burden than does the election upheld in Crampton v. Ohio,150
the companion case to McGautha. There the defendant, in order to
exercise his (assumed) constitutional right of allocation in a capital
case, had to testify on the merits at the combined guilt and penalty
stage of the trial. The Court in McGautha recognized that, unlike in
Crampton, any incrimination which results from the election to pre-
sent a defense, except in the special case yet to be discussed of the
defendant who takes the stand, comes from third persons (that is,
from the defendant's witnesses). 1 Any testimonial input by the de-
fendant is likely to be minimal. In other words, the incriminating
evidence supplied by the defendant is evidence which the prosecution
could have lawfully obtained without any cooperation from the de-
fendant if it had found the defense witnesses itself - an occurrence
which the defendant, in the absence of discovery, may seek to avoid.
Any help afforded the prosecution by the defendant's evidence
thus only peripherally affects the policies underlying the privilege.
The state treats the defendant fairly (the defendant need not choose
between deceit, incrimination or punishable silence) and maintains a
fairly balanced adversary system (the defendant has access to any
exculpatory evidence presented as part of the prosecution's case).
148. Id. at 758.
149. If the prosecution could not do so, how could it cross-examine the defendant's
self-defense witness? The prosecution's logical first question is: you really did see the
defendant kill the deceased, did you not? If the prosecution could not do so, what would
the judge instruct the jury to do in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence? Must
the judge tell the jury to consider only the incriminating evidence presented by the prose-
cution and not that presented by the defendant? Could a jury realistically follow such an
instruction and disregard incriminating evidence presented by the defendant? Surely not.
150. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
151. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 215-16.
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Since the impact on the defendant's privilege of the election to pre-
sent defense evidence is so slight, it is permissible, given the strong
state interests at stake, for the state to require defendants to suffer a
limited loss of their privilege when they present defense evidence.
Likewise, the compelled election does not violate the policies under-
lying the defendant's sixth amendment right to present witnesses in
one's defense because that right has always been subject to the pros-
ecution's testing of defense evidence - a testing designed to weaken
if not destroy the defendant's case. Thus, it is not unconstitutional to
compel defendants to choose between presenting a defense and not
incriminating themselves through disclosing their evidence.
The defenders of the California Supreme Court's approach might
respond that the timing of the defendant's disclosures is crucial. Pre-
trial disclosure of incriminating evidence is different because the
prosecution can use that evidence, unlike defense evidence first dis-
closed when the defendant presents it at trial, to satisfy its burden of
presenting a prima facie case (that is, of presenting evidence suffi-
cient to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the
prosecution's case). While this objection has force, it is still ulti-
mately unconvincing. First, the prosecutor rarely has difficulty prov-
ing a prima facie case. The specter of the prosecutor bringing
charges unsupported by sufficient evidence to get to the jury in hopes
that the defendant will fill the gaps is just that - an unrealistic
specter. The defendant's real concern with respect to incrimination is
that the prosecution will use incriminating defense evidence, not to
establish a prima facie case, but to accomplish the far more difficult
task of convincing the fact-finder of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the privilege against self-incrimination does re-
quire the prosecution to establish some sort of prima facie case
before expecting the defendant to respond, then the grand jury or
preliminary examination should perform that screening task. In most
jurisdictions they already do so.
The objection is also unconvincing because the defendant obtains
in any case only the most limited review of the sufficiency of the
prosecution's prima facie case. The defendant may move for a judg-
ment of acquittal (that is, a directed verdict) at the end of the prose-
cution's case.15 2 The motion tests the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. If the trial judge denies the motion,
the defendant, according to the traditional view, waives or withdraws
the motion by presenting defense evidence.153 Any subsequent review
152. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; MD. R. 4-324.
153. 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 463 (2d ed. 1982); see
also MD. R. 4-324(c) (defendant, by offering evidence, withdraws earlier motion for
judgment of acquittal). For criticism of the waiver rule, see Comment, The Motion for
Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 YALE L.J. 1151 (1961).
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of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, whether
conducted upon the defendant's renewal of the motion at the end of
all the evidence, upon the defendant's appeal, or upon collateral at-
tack, thus involves a review of all the evidence. In other words, the
defendant cannot obtain any review on the correctness of the denial
of the initial motion for judgment of acquittal (that is, the motion
made at the end of the prosecution's case). At all subsequent reviews
for evidentiary sufficiency, the prosecution necessarily enjoys any ad-
vantages acquired from discovery of the defendant's evidence. The
waiver doctrine thus sharply limits the ability of defendants to chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the prosecution's case before they must put
on a defense. However, it does have the advantage of focusing the
reviewing court's attention on the real basis for inquiry into the suffi-
ciency of the evidence of guilt: is there an unacceptable risk that the
convicted defendant is innocent?
154
Given the general acceptance (and correctness) of the waiver doc-
trine, the pretrial (as opposed to trial) disclosure of defense evidence
deprives the defendant of very little. The defendant no longer can
obtain from the trial judge a ruling on the sufficiency of the incrimi-
nating evidence gathered by the prosecution before it discovered the
defendant's evidence. That "deprivation" appears to be neither un-
wise nor unconstitutional. The trial judge's ruling, if adverse to the
defendant, was unreviewable in any case. 155
Discovery of Additional Information Needed to Test the
Defendant's Evidence
In his Williams dissent, Justice Black invoked the defendant's ab-
solute right to remain silent as a basis for condeming prosecutorial
discovery of alibi witnesses. According to Justice Black:
154. On the court's role in protecting the innocent when reviewing for evidentiary
sufficiency, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
155. Historically, trial judges also had discretion whether even to rule on the de-
fendant's motion if the defendant reserved the right to present evidence. 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 36, § 2496. While that rule derives primarily from civil cases, in criminal
cases before the mid-nineteenth century no review was available at all on the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a conviction. The jury was judge of the law as well as of the
facts and could define as it chose the elements of the offense and the evidence needed to
establish them. United States v. Sparf, 156 U.S. 51, 64-80 (1895) (federal criminal jury
no longer to decide legal questions such as sufficiency of evidence). Concern over the
jury's power arbitrarily to convict led to the development of greater judicial control over
jury verdicts; there was no concomitant concern about the prosecutor's power to use the
defendant's evidence to convict.
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The defendant, under our Constitution, need not do anything at all to de-
fend himself, and certainly he cannot be required to help convict himself.
Rather he has an absolute, unqualified right to compel the State to investi-
gate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince
the jury through its own resources. Throughout the process the defendant
has a fundamental right to remain silent, in effect challenging the State at
every point to: 'Prove it!"'
Justice Black's point is both eloquent and in large part correct, but it
has no application to cases like Williams in which the defendant
does not choose to remain silent but chooses to present evidence in
his own defense. This statement applies by its own terms only to
cases in which the defendant presents no evidence and simply chal-
lenges the prosecution to "prove it." In those cases, the defendant
may rely on the presumption of innocence 57 to require the prosecu-
tion to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without any help from
defense evidence. 6 8
Even when the defendant presents no defense, the prosecution may
obtain nontestimonial assistance from the defendant (for example, a
courtroom identification) and may obtain the benefit of an adverse
inference if the defendant fails to produce an available witness or
other evidence which one could reasonably expect to benefit the de-
fendant. 59 The former practice is defensible, 160 but the latter may
violate the privilege against self-incrimination if applied to cases
where the defendant has chosen to assert no defense."' Adverse in-
ferences should not result from the defendant's decision to present no
defense, but only from the presentation of an incomplete or inher-
ently weak defense.6 2
156. Williams, 399 U.S. at 112 (Black, J., dissenting).
157. The presumption of innocence is really an "assumption" of innocence. See
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, § 342.
158. The presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard are logical
corrolaries. Both doctrines require the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; the presumption adds that the fact-finder must determine guilt or innocence solely
on the basis of the evidence (including, of course, logical inferences that flow from it)
adduced as proof at trial. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1978). Neither of
these doctrines, however, provides a clear basis for a right not to present a defense. See
infra note 162.
159. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893) (missing witness rule); 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2273; Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations
on the Prosecutor's Closing Argument, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 46-48
(1973).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 64-80.
161. Adverse comment on the defendant's failure to testify is impermissible. Grif-
fin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Adverse comment on the defendant's failure to
present an incriminating defense also seems impermissible unless the compulsion to pre-
sent third party evidence generated by the comment is not as great as the compulsion on
the nontestifying defendant to take the stand. In the latter case, the missing witness (the
defendant) is visible to the jury. The adverse comment may therefore have more impact
on the jury.
162. Stier, Revisting the Missing Witness Inference, 44 MD. L. REV. 137, 164-65
(1985). If the defendant presents evidence, there is at least a partial waiver of the privi-
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Once the defendant presents evidence, the situation changes be-
cause the defendant is no longer just challenging the prosecution to
prove guilt. The prosecution now must do more to secure a convic-
tion than to prove the defendant's guilt; it must also prevent the de-
fendant's evidence from raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's
mind on an element of the offense or from establishing any defense
on which the defendant has the burden of persuasion. The prosecu-
tion has a legitimate interest in fully testing the defendant's evidence
to insure that it does not have a greater impact on the fact-finder
than it warrants. For this testing to be effective, the prosecution
needs access to all information relevant to the defense, including in-
criminating information which the defendant would prefer not to
disclose.
The Federal Rules163 and the many state discovery rules based on
them164 therefore adopt an unsound, if not incoherent, approach
when they condition prosecutorial discovery on the defendant's seek-
ing discovery from the prosecution - rather than on the defendant's
choosing to present a defense - and then limit that discovery to the
evidence the defendant intends to present at trial. The defendant
needs pretrial discovery in all cases because the defendant must al-
ways decide how to challenge the prosecution's evidence and what
defense evidence if any to present. The defendant should pay no
price for exercising discovery rights. The prosecution, on the other
hand, needs discovery (other than the limited discovery afforded by
the nontestimonial production of tangible things discussed below)
only if the defendant chooses to present a defense. Williams upholds
the authority of the state to require the defendant to "announce"
prior to trial whether he intends to present defense evidence. 6 ' If the
defendant responds affirmatively, that announcement should trigger
the prosecution's right to discover all relevant information reasona-
lege. Likewise, neither the presumption of innocence nor the reasonable doubt standard
bars the fact-finder from considering evidence supplied by the defendant in determining
guilt. The presumption limits the fact-finder to the evidence presented at trial, see Taylor
v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. at 484-85, and the reasonable doubt standard requires the fact-
finder to have a certain degree of confidence in the defendant's guilt before convicting. In
re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
163. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
164. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. P. LAW § 24.30, upheld in People v. Copicotto, 50
N.Y.2d 222, 406 N.E.2d 465, 428 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1980). For further citations, see 2 W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.4, at 518-19 (1985).
165. "Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter
of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the nature
of his defense . . . ." Williams, 399 U.S. at 85.
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bly needed to test that evidence.
In at least four areas, a considerable body of law has developed
affording the prosecution discovery of information which the defend-
ant does not intend to disclose at trial but which the prosecution may
find useful as a means to test evidence which the defendant does
intend to present.' 6 6 First, when the defendant takes the stand, the
prosecution may obtain through cross-examination information not
disclosed on direct examination. Second, when the defendant
presents the testimony of a witness other than the defendant, the
prosecution may discover any prior statements of the witness rele-
vant to the subject matter of the testimony. Third, when the defend-
ant puts his own mental condition at issue through the presentation
of psychiatric testimony, the prosecution may obtain the defendant's
testimony on that mental condition. Fourth, when the defendant
presents expert psychiatric testimony, the prosecution may discover
the names and reports of other psychiatrists retained by the defend-
ant but not called to testify.
The reasoning of these cases thus supports a broader form of
prosecutorial discovery than that upheld by Justice Traynor in
Jones. Not only should the prosecution obtain pretrial discovery of
the defendant's evidence, but it should also obtain discovery of infor-
mation needed to test the defendant's evidence. Indeed, when applied
to the facts in Jones, these cases support a result contrary to that
reached by Justice Traynor: the prosecution should have obtained
discovery of the reports of the nontestifying physicians who had
treated the defendant in order to rebut the testimony of the treating
physicians called by the defendant. Discovery was appropriate to
permit the prosecution to test the defendant's medical evidence of
impotency.
Discovery from the Testifying Defendant
The criminal defendant naturally waives the privilege against self-
incrimination on taking the stand, but the scope of the waiver is not
free from doubt. Early federal cases defined the waiver narrowly.
166. This growing, albeit by no means unanimous, body of law recognizes that the
privilege against self-incrimination and the other rights of the criminal defendant do not
bar prosecutorial discovery of information the prosecutor needs to test effectively the
defendant's evidence. Sometimes the prosecutor only obtains discovery at trial of the
necessary information because notions of work product (e.g., with respect to statements
obtained by counsel from defense witnesses) or considerations of fairness (no one contem-
plates requiring defendants to disclose the substance of their own testimony until they
take the stand after hearing the prosecution's case) may preclude earlier discovery. But
discovery at trial is still a form of discovery; and the prosecution may still use the defend-
ant's incriminating disclosures to impeach or rebut a defendant's evidence or, in the case
of a defendant's testimony on cross-examination, to establish the defendant's guilt.
1030
[VOL. 23: 993. 1986] Prosecutorial Discovery
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The court in Tucker v. United States,1 7 for example, reasoned that
compelling a defendant to answer questions outside the scope of the
direct testimony violated the privilege.168 Tucker thus allows a de-
fendant to give exculpatory testimony on one element of an offense
while avoiding incriminating testimony on another element of the
same offense.
Subsequent federal cases are less generous to the testifying de-
fendant, though also less clear. The Supreme Court remains content
with the vague rules that the "breadth" of the waiver "is determined
by the scope of the relevant cross-examination" 1 9 and that the de-
fendant cannot claim the privilege on matters "reasonably related to
the subject matter of his direct testimony."170
Several commentators17 ' have criticized the Supreme Court for ty-
ing the scope of the testifying defendant's waiver of the privilege to
the scope of cross-examination in the jurisdiction prosecuting the de-
fendant. These two issues are distinct; 72 and the scope of the de-
fendant's federal privilege should not vary from state to state nor be
dependent on state rules of evidence. In addition, the Court's appli-
cation of the federal privilege to the states - a relatively recent
event 73 - has raised unanswered questions on the scope of the priv-
ilege in states that follow the wide-open rule on cross-examination,
167. 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925). The defendant on direct examination limited his
testimony to the denial of one element of the offense charged (the fraudulent nature of
his business). He then claimed the privilege when asked on cross-examination about an-
other element (the use of the mails). The trial court compelled the defendant to answer
the prosecutor's question, but the circuit court reversed the conviction.
168. Id. at 824. The Tucker court was influenced by the fact that the government
had no independent evidence of the defendant's use of the mails.
169. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958).
170. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971). Lower federal courts
have construed quite broadly the "subject matter" of direct and the required "relation-
ship" between that matter and the question asked on cross-examination. MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 62, § 132, at 324; see also Neely v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1261 (7th
Cir. 1983). Thus, Patty Hearst, after testifying on direct that she had participated under
duress in the crime charged (a bank robbery), could not invoke the privilege with respect
to her post-crime activities even though her answers to the prosecutor's questions might
help establish her criminal intent. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.
1977). This approach most likely would have produced a different result in Tucker be-
cause the government surely could have established some connection between the defend-
ant's placing an advertisement in a newspaper that went through the mails (the subject
matter of the prosecutor's cross-examination) and his fraudulent purpose (the matter put
in issue by the defendant's testimony).
171. E.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, § 132; Carlson, Cross-Ex-
amination of the Accused, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 705 (1967).
172. For a distinguished opinion so holding, see Neely v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 38, 292
N.W.2d 859 (1980).
173. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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rather than the federal rule limiting cross-examination to the scope
of direct. 74 Under the Court's present approach, if taken literally, a
prosecutor in a wide-open jurisdiction may compel answers to ques-
tions that seek information relevant to the charge regardless of any
link to the subject matter of direct examination. Wigmore strongly
supports that result, arguing that the necessary connection between
all relevant facts makes any partial disclosure by the defendant dis-
torting. Thus, the defendant's taking the stand to testify on one rele-
vant fact is a waiver as to all relevant factsY.7 5
The prosecution may also seek the testifying defendant's help in
producing relevant documents and tangible things. 17 6 The defendant
can no longer resist discovery on the ground that the act of produc-
tion contains implicit testimony on the existence, location and au-
thenticity of the evidence produced.'" Thus, if the defendant in
Jones had testified that an accident seven years previous to the al-
leged rape had made him impotent, there is no doubt that the prose-
cution could have obtained from the defendant by trial subpoena any
reports in the defendant's possession prepared by physicians who had
treated the defendant for the injury. 78
174. See Carlson, supra note 171, at 717-19.
175. 8 . WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2276. In defense of Wigmore one might add
that an adverse inference seems appropriate if a testifying defendant denies one element
of an offense but remains silent on another. An adverse inference is permissible only if
the defendant's failure to deny or explain that element is unprivileged. Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916). Of course, with respect to the second element on
which the defendant wishes to remain silent, the defendant does face the trilemma of
perjury, contempt, or self-condemnation; but that trilemma seems less cruel when the
defendant has already chosen to testify on some relevant matters.
Wigmore's approach magnifies the help which the prosecution may compel from the
testifying defendant; but, as cases like Hearst demonstrate, the prosecution may obtain
considerable help from the defendant even if the compulsion to respond on cross-exami-
nation only extends to questions somehow related to the direct testimony. The difference
is only one of degree. There are very few cases finding error in the prosecution's cross-
examination of the accused. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, § 132, at 323
n,5. Present law in practice, therefore, does not appear that far removed from Wigmore's
position.
176. The defendant's waiver of the privilege covers not only testimony from the
stand but also the testimonial production of evidence - at least if the evidence sought
relates in some fashion to the defendant's direct testimony. See authorities cited infra
note 177.
177. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2276, at 474; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 62, § 132, at 323. For a recent case so holding, see United States v. Black,
767 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1985).
178. Quite clearly, the prosecution could also ask the defendant on cross-examina-
tion for the names of all the physicians who had treated him for the injury. Likewise, if
the defendant in Hughes had testified that he had not fired a shot at the victim, there is
little doubt about the enforceability against the defendant of a subpoena requiring him to
produce all guns registered in his name. The prosecution's interest in testing the truthful-
ness of the defendant's testimony justifies compelling the defendant to testify fully.
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Discovery of Prior Statements of Defense Witnesses
There is little authority on whether the calling of a witness by a
nontestifying defendant constitutes a waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination. In practice, the courts do not treat the calling of a
defense witness as a waiver of the privilege except in the special case
of an expert who testifies on the defendant's mental condition. 17 9 If,
for example, the defendant in Jones had called several physicians
who testified that they had treated the defendant for an injury that
had made him impotent, the prosecution could not compel the de-
fendant's testimony on the injury or on his present sexual ability.180
The prosecution simply does not need the defendant's testimony, or
at least any oral testimony from the stand, to test the defense
evidence.181
Nevertheless, if the defendant does call a witness, the prosecution
may often obtain some discovery from the witness. 8 2 The prosecu-
tor, for example, could question the witness whether the witness pre-
viously gave a statement to the defendant, defense counsel, or a de-
fense investigator. The prosecution naturally wishes to uncover any
prior statement of the witness that might be useful in impeaching
the witness' trial testimony. If the defense had given the witness a
copy of the statement, there is no reason why the court could not
compel the witness to produce it. More likely, the witness will not
have retained a copy and may even be unaware whether the defense
179. If the defense expert testifies on the defendant's testimonial responses to a
mental examination, the prosecution's expert must also have access to those testimonial
responses for the prosecution adequately to test the defense evidence. Thus, although the
prosecution cannot compel the defendant to take the stand in front of the jury, it can
compel the defendant to submit to a mental examination by the prosecution's, or at least
by a neutral, expert. In this special case some sort of waiver does take place when the
defendant calls the witness. See infra text accompanying note 192.
180. That result seems correct because allowing the prosecution to call the defend-
ant as its witness would unfairly tip the balance in the prosecution's favor and subject the
defendant to the cruel trilemma of perjury, contempt or self-condemnation.
181. It is a closer question whether the prosecution may compel the defendant to
submit to a physical examination not requiring any testimonial responses. That examina-
tion may raise fourth amendment, as well as due process, problems, see Winston v. Lee,
105 S.Ct. 1611 (1985) (unreasonable search and seizure medically to remove a bullet
from the defendant's body despite evidentiary value to prosecution of connecting bullet to
crime victim's gun), but it does not appear to raise any fifth amendment problems.
182. For instance, if the defendant in Jones called his treating physicians and in-
troduced reports prepared by them, the prosecution could surely ask the physicians, ei-
ther pretrial or at trial, to produce any other reports they had prepared on the defend-
ant's condition. If they had retained copies, the physicians could surely be compelled to
produce them; otherwise, the prosecutor could examine them about the present wherea-
bouts of the missing reports and their recollection of their contents.
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made some record of the statement and whether the defense still re-
tains that record.
Can the prosecution obtain discovery from the defendant of the
witness' prior statement? The witness' prior statement may incrimi-
nate the defendant because there may be inconsistencies between the
witness' exculpatory trial testimony and the prior statement. The
prosecution, upon discovery of the statement, may utilize those in-
consistencies to impeach the witness' trial testimony and thus demol-
ish the defendant's defense. Such a use is an incriminating use, 183
but the incriminating testimony is nevertheless the prior statement of
the witness and not any testimony of the defendant. In United States
v. Wright,8 4 the court nevertheless found testimony by the defend-
ant in the act of production. In producing a prior statement by a
defense witness, the defendant impliedly testifies that the statement
exists, is in the defendant's possession, and is authentic. 8 5 The trial
court therefore may not require the defendant to produce it.
There are troubles with the Wright court's analysis, not the least
of which is that the Supreme Court subsequently ignored it. In
United States v. Nobles,'86 a case with strikingly similar facts, 8 7 an
unanimous Court held that compelled production of the prior state-
ment by a defense witness did not violate the defendant's privilege
because the privilege was personal. The fact that the statements of
third parties elicited by the defense investigator and recorded by him
might incriminate the defendant was irrelevant. "Requiring their
production from the investigator . . . would not in any sense compel
183. The California Supreme Court relied exclusively on the incriminating nature
of the use when it recently held that a state criminal defendant's state constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination permitted the defendant to refuse disclosure of prior
statements by defense witnesses. In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1985).
184. 489 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
185. Id. at 1193 n.15.
186. 422 U.S. 225 (1975). In Nobles the government obtained discovery of a de-
fense witness' prior statement after the defense witness had testified at trial. The Court
held that the defendant had waived the work product privilege by electing to call the
witness. Id. at 236-40. In jurisdictions in which defendants must disclose prior to trial
which witnesses they will call, some courts have held that the defendant may claim work
product protection for a witness' prior statements until the witness actually testifies at
trial. George v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. App. 1979). The George case was followed
in Spears v. State, 272 Ind. 634, 401 N.E.2d 331, on rehearing, 272 Ind. 647, 403
N.E.2d 828 (1980). Prior to that time the prosecution should obtain its own statement
from the witness if it wants to know what the witness has to say. In a growing number of
jurisdictions, however, work product only protects an attorney's mental impressions and
trial strategies and not third party statements. In these jurisdictions, pretrial discovery is
available of both the identity and prior statements of defense witnesses. Commonwealth
v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 461 N.E.2d 222 (1984) (court rule limits work product doc-
trine to mental impressions of attorney and excludes witness statements); State v. Har-
din, 558 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
187. In both Wright and Nobles the defense witness was a defense investigator
who sought, among other things, to impeach the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses.
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respondent [the defendant] to be a witness against himself or extort
communications from him."1 '
The Nobles Court made no mention of the doctrine of testimonial
production invoked by the Wright court. This omission is surprising
since the Supreme Court's revival of that doctrine followed next
term in Fisher. Was the omission due to the Court's belief that testi-
monial production was absent, or that even if present, it was irrele-
vant? The answer to this question may affect the validity of other
kinds of prosecutorial discovery.
The Nobles Court viewed the defense investigator as the producer
of the prior statement (that is, the Court viewed the situation as
similar to where the prosecution asks a physician who had treated
the defendant to produce a medical report from office files). This
view of the case is unrealistic. Plainly the defendant, through his
counsel, had control over the report; there was no indication that the
investigator even retained a copy.18 9 In Wright, on the other hand,
the prosecutor's first question in cross-examining the defense investi-
gator was to ask the investigator to produce his report. The prosecu-
tor plainly expected the investigator to produce it, but the court ana-
lyzed the demand as one directed to the defendant.
The Wright analysis of the facts is more realistic. The defense in-
vestigator, as well as the defense attorney, are agents of the defend-
ant; and demands directed to them are demands directed to the de-
fendant. Surely the Nobles Court did not mean to limit its holding to
188. Nobles has had a significant impact on criminal trial practice. Shortly after
the decision, the Supreme Court promulgated a new criminal rule requiring both the
defendant and the government to produce the prior statements of their witnesses after
each witness had testified. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (narrowly defining "statement"). Con-
gress had previously imposed that obligation only on the government. 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1982) (The Jencks Act). A number of states have likewise opted for the reciprocal dis-
covery of witness statements; the courts, outside of California, have upheld this form of
prosecutorial discovery. Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 505 Pa. 442, 480 A.2d 980 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 461 N.E.2d 222 (1984); Spears v. State, 272
Ind. 634, 401 N.E.2d 331 (1980); State v. Hardin, 558 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977); State v. Sandstrom, 225 Kan. 717, 595 P.2d 324 (1979).
For pre-Nobles cases reaching the same result, see Montague v. State, 55 N.J. 387,
262 A.2d 398 (1970); People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 247 N.E.2d 651, 299 N.Y.S.2d
830 (1969); People v. Sanders, 110 11. App. 2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 124 (1969). The con-
trary California authority is In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr.
569 (1985).
189. The dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, the opinion which reached the
same result as the Supreme Court, made plain that the investigator's report was under
the control of defendant's trial counsel. The court noted that defense counsel had the
investigator's report at times physically in his hands when he was examining a witness
and otherwise in his desk at the trial table. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 159
(9th Cir. 1974) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting), rev'd, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
1035
the unusual situation where the defense witness still had some con-
trol over the prior statement. The holding must also cover - if it is
to be meaningful at all - cases in which the defense witness (for
example, an eyewitness) does not have a copy of the statement and
does not know for certain whether the defendant does. In these situa-
tions, the prosecution necessarily addresses its discovery demand di-
rectly to the defendant.
Nobles therefore makes sense only on the assumption that there
was an act of testimonial production by the defendant. However,
that "testimony" was not sufficient to bar prosecutorial discovery. It
was not sufficient because, as the Court recognized, the "investiga-
tor's contemporaneous report might provide critical insight into the
issues of credibility that the investigator's testimony would raise." 190
Given the importance of the report for testing the defendant's evi-
dence, the defendant could not resist production on the ground of
privilege. Some waiver of the privilege therefore accompanied the
defendant's presenting the testimony of his investigator. While that
waiver did not permit the prosecution to question the defendant on
the witness stand, it did permit the prosecution to obtain acts of tes-
timonial production.
In many cases such "testimony" will be of considerable assistance
to the prosecution because it will be unaware, or at least uncertain,
about the existence of prior statements and would have difficulty au-
thenticating them if it found them lying on the street. Even when
these difficulties are absent, the courts have in other contexts recog-
nized a claim of privilege when the act of production, as opposed to
the contents of the document, told the prosecution very little.19' The
defendant's production of the prior statements of defense witnesses
may tell the prosecution a great deal, but Nobles nevertheless holds
that the defendant may be compelled to produce those statements to
permit the prosecution adequately to test the credibility of the
witnesses.
Discovery from Defendant Who Offers Expert Testimony on
Mental Condition
In at least one context the courts have treated the defendant's
calling of a defense witness as a partial waiver of the privilege
190. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 232.
191. Thus, a doctor can raise a claim of privilege in response to a grand jury sub-
poena for medical records despite the fact that most doctors maintain medical records in
their offices and despite the government's ability to authenticate the subpoenaed records
through the testimony of the doctor's secretary or some other third party. Absent a fur-
ther showing that the government knows that the doctor subject to the subpoena pos-
sesses the records sought, the act of production is privileged because it tells the govern-
ment something incriminating which it does not know about the existence of the records.
United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1983).
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against self-incrimination justifying further discovery from the de-
fendant. That context is where the defendant presents the testimony
of a psychiatrist or other mental health expert on the defendant's
mental state.192 The "waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence" doc-
trine permits the prosecution to compel potentially incriminating tes-
timony from the defendant on the mental state that the defendant
put at issue."' This waiver doctrine does not depend on any knowing
and intelligent choice by the defendant to forgo claiming the privi-
lege against self-incrimination but represents a conclusion based on
policy grounds that the defendant's presenting of expert psychiatric
testimony results in a limited forfeiture of fifth amendment
protection.1
94
The waiver doctrine has had its most frequent application in the
context of insanity and related defenses where the courts have in-
voked it to uphold a compulsory mental examination of the defend-
ant. Court rules often require defendants to give advance notice if
they intend to rely on an insanity defense or to introduce expert tes-
timony on mental condition. Once a defendant gives such notice, the
court may order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by
a psychiatrist chosen by the court or the prosecutor.1
9 5
Responses by the defendant to the court-appointed psychiatrist's
questions may be both testimonial and incriminating. The Court has
held that the responses are testimonial if the psychiatrists base their
trial testimony on the "substance" of the disclosures made by the
defendant. 6 Although the Court did not further elucidate, the ex-
planation for its holding must be that the "substance" of the defend-
ant's utterances, which tell us something about mental condition, are
products of the defendant's choice; while the defendant's blood or
handwriting, which tell us something about physical condition or
identity, are matters over which the defendant has no control. It is
the defendant's capacity to deceive, or at least attempt to deceive,
192. The defendant may present that testimony (hereinafter referred to as psychi-
atric testimony) to support an insanity defense, a claim of diminished capacity, a denial
that the defendant acted with the necessary mens rea, or to establish the presence of
mitigating circumstances at sentencing.
193. White, The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment Privilege in
Capital Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 946-47 (1983).
194. Id. at 949; see also United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc).
195. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2.
196. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1981) (psychiatrist based prognosis of
dangerousness on defendant's statements to him).
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that makes statements to the psychiatrist testimonial.197
The defendant's statements to a court-appointed psychiatrist may
incriminate the defendant in either of two ways: the defendant may
admit to the examining psychiatrist the commission of the acts
charged; or the examining psychiatrist may conclude from the de-
fendant's statements that the defendant was sane or had the requi-
site mental state required for the commission of the offense. Court
rules 98 or case law' 99 usually grant the defendant use immunity
which eliminates the danger of incrimination in the first situation
(that is, incrimination on the issue of the defendant's guilt other
than with respect to the mental state which the defendant has put in
issue). The danger of incrimination in the second situation, however,
is real and substantial because the purpose of the compulsory mental
examination is to permit the prosecution to test, and destroy if possi-
ble, the defendant's defense. The defendant's statements are incrimi-
nating if the prosecution can use them to eliminate an insanity or
related defense and thus obtain a conviction.2 °0
The justification for the compulsory mental examination is the
prosecution's legitimate interest in testing the truthfulness of the de-
fendant's psychiatric testimony through cross-examination and re-
buttal evidence. Cross-examining the defense psychiatrist does not
provide sufficient testing because the critical testimony is not the
psychiatrist's but the defendant's testimony to the psychiatrist.201 In
addition, effective rebuttal of psychiatric opinion testimony normally
requires contradictory opinion testimony by experts who have access
to the same information. 0 2 Thus, the maintenance of a fair state-
197. The Smith Court did mention that the psychiatrist's courtroom testimony
"rested on statements respondent made, and remarks he omitted, in reciting the details of
the crime." Id. at 464. The fact that defendant's "recitations" included details of the
crime seems irrelevant. What is relevant (as the Court's wording indicates) is the matters
"made" or "omitted" by the defendant.
198. The Federal Rules provide that the defendant's statements and the fruits
thereof are inadmissible "except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the
defendant has introduced testimony." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
199. Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978) (federal constitution bars
state from conditioning insanity plea on defendant's waiver of privilege on issue of guilt).
Compare the federal cases cited in Gibson which were decided prior to the enactment of
Rule 12.2(c), and which reach the same result as a matter of federal common law.
200. United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane). In
Byers, the court-appointed psychiatrist testified, with devastating effect, that the defend-
ant had admitted to him that his claim of supernatural influences affecting his mind at
the time of the killing only occurred to him long afterwards.
Byers also rejected as wrong in principle, and no longer viable after Smith, earlier
cases holding that testimony establishing sanity was not incriminating. Id. at 1112. In
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court held that testimony was incriminating
if it subjected the defendant to more severe punishment at sentencing. For a more recent
case still treating evidence establishing the defendant's sanity as not incriminating, see
State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Iowa 1984).
201. White, supra note 193, at 961.
202. Byers, 740 F.2d at 1114.
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individual balance, fundamental fairness to all the parties, and judi-
cial common sense combine to legitimize prosecutorial discovery of
the defendant's mind when the defendant puts his mental state in
issue.203 That discovery does not include compelling the defendant to
testify before the fact-finder but it does include, unlike other forms
of permissible prosecutorial discovery, compelling the defendant to
furnish potentially incriminating oral testimony.
The case law reflects, albeit not so clearly, an additional limitation
on this form of prosecutorial discovery. The waiver doctrine should
not apply whenever the defendant introduces psychiatric testimony
but only when a defense psychiatric expert testifies on the basis of
testimonial responses obtained from the defendant. Psychiatric ex-
perts normally base their evaluation of an individual's mental state
on an examination or interview that includes questions requiring tes-
timonial responses. However, it is possible for psychiatrists who have
not examined a defendant to testify so long as they have some other
basis for reaching a judgment on the issue before the court. 204 In
such cases, the prosecution does not have the same need for testimo-
nial responses from the defendant* to test effectively the defendant's
psychiatric evidence. The prosecution should have access to the de-
fendant's testimonial responses only if defense psychiatrists base
their conclusions, in whole or in part, on an examination of the de-
fendant. This limitation explains why the prosecution should have
that access even if a compulsory mental examination of the defend-
ant is not indispensable to the prosecution but only enhances its abil-
ity to test the defendant's evidence. If an expert's testifying for the
defense has obtained the benefit of testimonial responses from the
defendant, fairness requires that there be an expert available to the
prosecution who has received the same access.20 5 Otherwise there
will be no fair state-individual balance in the adversary system.206
203. Id. at 1113.
204. See White, supra note 193, at 944 n.5 and authorities cited therein.
205. As the court explained in Battie v. Estelle: "By introducing psychiatric testi-
mony obtained by the defense from a psychiatric examination of the defendant, the de-
fense constructively puts the defendant himself on the stand and therefore the defendant
is subject to psychiatric examination by the State in the same manner." 655 F.2d 692,
702 n.22 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. The validity of this conclusion should not depend on the allocation of the
burden of proof on the defendant's sanity or other mental condition. Some of the earlier
federal cases upholding compulsory mental examinations did emphasize the government's
need, once the defendant introduced some evidence on sanity, to obtain psychiatric testi-
mony to satisfy its burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.
1968). Congress has now acted to require the defendant to prove insanity by clear and
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Prosecutorial discovery under the waiver by offer of psychiatric
testimony doctrine is subject to one further limitation not applicable
to other types of prosecutorial discovery. This limitation requires
that any evidence obtained by the prosecution be admissible only on
the issue of the defendant's mental condition.207 Thus, the prosecu-
tion cannot use the results of a compulsory mental examination to
establish, for example, that the defendant killed the homicide victim,
did not shoot in self-defense, or satisfied any element of the crime
charged other than mental condition put in issue by the defendant.
Other evidence discovered by the prosecution (for example, the de-
fendant's alibi or self-defense witnesses) is not, at least under the
thesis advocated in this Article,08 subject to that limitation and may
be used by the prosecution to establish any facet of the defendant's
guilt.
The explanation for this difference lies in the broader discovery
available under the waiver by offer of psychiatric testimony doctrine.
That doctrine permits the prosecution not only to discovery evidence
which the defendant does not intend to disclose at trial, but also to
obtain that evidence by interrogating the defendant in the absence of
counsel. 209 The interrogator is free to inquire into the prior deviant
conduct of the defendant, including any participation in the crime
charged.210 Indeed, the defendant's description of the scope of that
participation usually provides the interrogator with the most reliable
evidence for reaching a conclusion on the defendant's mental state at
that time. Thus, for the defendant to cooperate fully in the examina-
tion, and preserve the right to present psychiatrist testimony," l the
defendant may need to confess to the acts charged. If the prosecu-
tion could use such a confession to a court-appointed psychiatrist to
establish guilt, then the defendant's plea of insanity would be the
convincing evidence. See Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §
401, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 20 (Supp. 11 1984)). This change in the
burden of proof should not affect the government's discovery rights. Prosecutorial discov-
ery serves dual purposes: to permit the prosecution to prove its case (arguably no longer
applicable if the defense must prove insanity) and to permit the prosecution to test or
rebut the defendant's case. The latter purpose of discovery - which recognizes that dis-
covery is an essential ingredient of the adversary system - remains intact even if the
defendant must prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence. The prosecution still has
a legitimate interest in testing the defendant's case.
207. See authorities cited supra notes 198-99.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
209. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), and
the many cases cited therein. The Supreme Court had earlier recognized the defendant's
constitutional right to obtain advice from counsel before requesting or submitting to a
psychiatric examination. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-71 (1981).
210. Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1978).
211. It is well established that the trial court may preclude the testimony of a
defense psychiatric expert if the defendant refuses a court-ordered examination designed
to permit the prosecution to test the defendant's evidence. The lead case is State v. Whit-
low, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965) (Francis, J.).
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equivalent of a guilty plea.
Court rules212 and judicial decisions213 have avoided that result by
treating the waiver that accompanies the defendant's offer of psychi-
atric testimony as a limited waiver authorizing the prosecution to use
the fruits of a compulsory mental examination only to establish that
the defendant had the mental state at issue. At least two decisions
suggest that so limiting the defendant's waiver is constitutionally re-
quired. In Gibson v. Zahradnick,214 a murder defendant's counsel
sought and obtained a court order for a psychiatric examination on
the defendant's competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of
the crime.21 5 The court reasoned the state could not condition the
defendant's right to an examination on competency and sanity upon
a waiver of the privilege of self-incrimination on all elements of
guilt. 216 Shortly before Gibson, Collins v. Auger2 7 had reached the
same result on due process grounds.
The results in Gibson and Collins, while supportable, are not with-
out their difficulties. Although responses by the defendant during a
mental examination and conclusions made by the examiner thereon
are admissible only on the issue of the defendant's mental condition,
a similar limitation does not apply to questions posed by the exam-
iner. As conceded by the court in Gibson, the defendant's description
of his activities at the time of the crime, including any participation
by him in the crime, are of great interest to the examining psychia-
trist; and the psychiatrist, in testifying on the issue of the defend-
ant's mental condition, may find it necessary to disclose any criminal
activity related by the defendant.21 8 In addition, even if the psychia-
212. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
213. See, e.g., Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1978).
214. 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978).
215. The examination took place at a state mental hospital. At trial, the prosecu-
tion called the examining psychiatrist to establish that the defendant shot the victim. The
court found a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination even though the trial
court had not compelled the defendant to undergo a psychiatric examination but the
defendant had sought the examination in his own defense.
216. Gibson, 581 F.2d at 80. In other words, the state had forced an unacceptable
choice on the defendant: either you forgo your right to obtain expert psychiatric testi-
mony in support of an insanity defense or you testify fully on the crimes charged. The
state therefore could not insist on a full waiver of the privilege as a price of presenting
psychiatric testimony on insanity.
217. 577 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1978).
218. Gibson, 581 F.2d at 79. Chief Judge Haynsworth believed that prompt and
strong cautionary instructions would prevent the jury from considering the defendant's
admissions on the issue of guilt. Id.; see also Watters v. Hubbard, 725 F.2d 381 (6th Cir.
1984) (defendant entitled to cautionary instruction but court need not have acted sua
sponte when a defense psychiatrist testified on cross-examination that defendant admit-
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trist does avoid testifying on the defendant's admissions of guilt, it is
difficult to ensure that the prosecution does not use that information
to strengthen its case. For example, in the absence of any transcript
of the psychiatric examination, defense counsel has no way of know-
ing whether an admission by the defendant led the prosecution to a
missing eyewitness.
219
These difficulties in effectuating the use immunity which accompa-
nies a limited waiver of the privilege suggest that it would be unde-
sirable to apply the limitation elsewhere. Other information discov-
ered from the defendant should be fully usable by the prosecution.
Prosecutorial discovery at a compulsory mental examination is
unique because the defendant must undergo the equivalent of custo-
dial interrogation without the presence of a lawyer or even a friend.
Even if the defendant requests the examination, the examining psy-
chiatrists, particularly if they are court-appointed rather than re-
tained and paid by the defendant, may view their role as that of a
neutral expert rather than a member of the defense camp.220 Such
conditions may be necessary to assure that the prosecution obtains
adequate access to the defendant's mental state. However, fairness to
the defendant requires that testimony obtained from the defendant
under those conditions be used by this adversary only to establish the
mental state which the defendant has put in issue (that is, to test or
rebut the defendant's psychiatric evidence). The defendant deserves
such assurance before undergoing a psychiatric examination; and the
prosecution should prove independently the other elements of the de-
fendant's guilt rather than relying on any confession by the defend-
ant to the psychiatrist.
Discovery from Defendant Who Presents the Testimony of an
Expert or Other Witness
The defendant's decision to call a psychiatric or other expert wit-
ness also permits the prosecution, in a growing number of jurisdic-
tions, to compel the defendant to disclose the indentities of other ex-
perts known to the defendant who have knowledge of relevant
ted rape charges).
219. For a fuller description of the problems raised by the illicit prosecutorial use
of the defendant's admissions of guilt, see White, supra note 193, at 965-76.
220. In some jurisdictions, court-appointed psychiatrists (the only psychiatrists
available to indigent defendants) are "disinterested experts" whose reports are available
both to the defendant and to the prosecution. See TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 46.03 (Vernon
1978); Granviel v. Estelle, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (upholding the
Texas statute). In these jurisdictions it does not really matter whether the defendant or
the prosecution seeks the examination because the examiner is disinterested and the re-
sults are available to both sides. For instance, an indigent defendant with a colorable
claim of insanity has a due process right to psychiatric assistance, Ake v. Oklahoma, 105
S. Ct. 1087 (1985), but that right may not include a confidential report from a friendly
psychiatrist of one's choice. Id. at 1101-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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information but whom the defendant does not intend to call at
trial.22 In these cases the compelled disclosures do not involve any
oral testimony by the defendant but are at most acts of testimonial
production (that is, the production of the nontestifying expert's name
and report).
This type of prosecutorial discovery should not be limited to cases
in which the defendant calls an expert witness. Indeed, the justifica-
tion for such discovery may be greater with respect to other defense
witnesses such as alibi witnesses because the work product doctrine
normally bars one party from calling another party's unused ex-
perts.222 A party has no such proprietary right with respect to other
potential witnesses known to the party.223
Compelling a defendant who chooses to stand mute to disclose the
identity of a witness whose testimony might help to convict most
likely violates the privilege because the defendant's identifying the
witness constitutes incriminating testimony by the defendant. Al-
though defendants cannot base a claim of privilege on the potentially
incriminating testimony of the witness, they can invoke the privilege
to avoid producing a witness unknown to the prosecution.224 The de-
fendant's disclosure of the witness is an act of testimonial production
analogous to the production of documents or tangible things. Under
Fisher, the prosecution cannot compel the defendant to acknowledge
the existence and whereabouts of a witness unless those matters are
"foregone conclusions. 225
221. A defendant will not call a particular expert usually because the nontestifying
expert's report is unhelpful to the defense, if not downright incriminating.
222. Parties must retain their own experts unless exceptional circumstance justify
the discovery and use of an expert retained by another party. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4)(B)o
223. Take the case of the defendant who, in a notice of alibi, states that he was at
a given address at the time of the alleged crime and that he intends to rely on the testi-
mony of Jane Doe to establish that alibi. Most notice of alibi rules require no more in the
way of disclosure. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1. In investigating the alibi, the prosecu-
tion learns that Doe will testify that at the time of the crime she and seven or eight
others (including the defendant) were playing poker at the given address. Doe refuses to
identify the other participants, or identifies them in a fashion (e.g., by supplying nick-
names only) that makes it impossible for the prosecution to locate them. Should not the
prosecution be able to discover from the defendant the names and addresses of the other
poker players, if known to the defendant? In other words, should not notice of alibi rules
require the defendant to disclose the names of all persons at the scene of the alibi and not
just those persons on whom the defendant intends to rely to establish the alibi? Of
course, the testimony of the other poker players may "incriminate" the defendant by
destroying his alibi (i.e., by testifying that the defendant was not present at the game).
224. Justice Traynor so held in Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d
919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
225. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. The Court has not resolved whether the defendant's
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But is not the situation different if the defendant has chosen to
present an alibi witness, or perhaps even a self-defense witness? Does
the privilege shield the defendant's presentation of a distorted and
perhaps untruthful defense? Should not the court treat the defend-
ant's calling a witness as a limited waiver of the privilege which jus-
tifies requiring the defendant to produce the names and reports of
other potential witnesses? If Nobles, correctly understood,"' autho-
rizes compelling, when the defendant calls a witness, some acts of
testimonial production (that is, the production of the witness' prior
statements), then it is logical to require other acts of testimonial pro-
duction (for example, the production of the names and reports of
persons whom the defendant does not intend to call at trial), so long
as the prosecution needs that discovery, as it needed the discovery
afforded in Nobles, adequately to test the defendant's evidence.
There is a lack of authority to support the above position. How-
ever, it seems appropriate that some limitation on the defendant's
privilege should accompany the presentation of a defense witness. At
the very least, the fact-finder should be able to draw an adverse in-
ference from the defendant's unexplained failure to produce a miss-
ing witness whose testimony, if the fact-finder believes the witnesses
whom the defendant did call, one would expect to be favorable to the
defendant. The drawing of such an inference, which courts would
most likely permit under these circumstances,227 is of questionable
constitutionality if the defendant's failure to produce the witness
were privileged.228
When the defendant presents a selected or truncated version of the
facts, the prosecution deserves more than the benefit of an adverse
inference which the fact-finder may or may not draw. The prosecu-
tion deserves, at least if it affords reciprocal discovery,2 29 an opportu-
disclosure of a list of trial witnesses is testimonial, but it has made plain that disclosures
about the crime (including the identity of witnesses) are testimonial. As the Court recog-
nized in Williams, "[ilt might . . . be argued that the testimonial disclosures protected
by the Fifth Amendment include only statements relating to the historical facts of the
crime, not statements relating solely to what a defendant proposes to do at trial." Wil-
liams, 399 U.S. at 86 n.17. Thus, although the defendant's (really defense counsel's)
decision to call certain witnesses may not be testimonial, the defendant's implied state-
ment that here is a witness with knowledge of relevant facts - made in response to a
prosecutorial discovery demand - is testimonial. It is less clear how that statement is
incriminating. The Court's reasoning in Schmerber seemingly does not permit the de-
fendant to argue that the witness' testimony may incriminate the defendant. Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 761 n.5. The incriminating testimony must be the defendant's testimony.
Perhaps the defendant can argue that the testimony is incriminating because it supplies
the prosecution with a lead or link in the chain of evidence leading to the establishment
of guilt. Hoffmann v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
227. 8 J. WIaMORE, supra note 36, § 2273.
228. Stier, Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference, 44 MD. L. REv. 137, 159-66
(1985).
229. On an alibi defense, for example, for defense discovery to be fully reciprocal,
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nity to put before the fact-finder all the revelant evidence on the
issues raised by the defense evidence. To do so the prosecution may
need some help from the defendant. While it does not seem appropri-
ate or necessary to permit the prosecution to question or otherwise
obtain oral testimony from the defendant," 0 it does seem appropri-
ate to require the defendant through counsel to make the disclosures
necessary to permit the prosecution to test the defendant's
evidence. 2
31
Imposing such a requirement, at least with respect to alibi wit-
nesses, does not seem to violate the policies behind the privilege. The
defendant does not face the cruel trilemma of perjury, contempt, or
self-condemnation. He may remain silent if he chooses. But if he
chooses to advance a defense such as an alibi defense, he must make
a complete disclosure of relevant information. Obligating a defend-
ant to do so does not upset a fair state-individual balance because
the prosecution cannot be expected to shoulder the burden of gather-
ing evidence independently to rebut evidence selected and controlled
by the defendant.
Thus, a requirement that the defendant produce the "missing" al-
ibi witness, although not justified under the Williams acceleration
rationale, still does not constitute compulsion in violation of the priv-
ilege. The disclosure requirement is a reasonable condition imposed
on the defendant's presenting the testimony of an alibi witness: the
defendant must choose between presenting no defense and presenting
a defense which the prosecution may effectively test. That choice
does not impermissibly force the defendant to choose between the
sixth amendment right to call witnesses and the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination because the state has a legitimate
interest in testing the defendant's evidence and any testimonial in-
crimination by the defendant is slight. The choice imposed on the
it should include more than the prosecutorial disclosure, as provided by Federal Rule
12.1, of alibi rebuttal witnesses. Defendants should also obtain discovery (as they do
under many state rules, see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(i), but not under the more
restrictive Federal Rule 16) of all persons known by the prosecution to have been at the
scene of the crime. The defendant should be able to fully test the prosecution's evidence
of presence at the crime scene.
230. In contrast, see the exceptional case of a defense psychiatric expert who testi-
fies on the basis of testimonial responses obtained from the defendant, discussed supra
note 192 and accompanying text.
231. In the hypothetical presented in note 223 supra, for example, counsel may
present the testimony of alibi witness Jane Doe, assuming counsel does not believe the
testimony to be perjured, only if the defendant discloses to the prosecution the identities
of the other poker players not called by the defendant because they do not remember the
defendant's participation in the game.
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defendant is analogous to the choice a defendant must make in de-
termining whether to take the stand in support of an alibi defense.232
The above argument has greater force in the context of an alibi
defense than with respect to other defenses because alibi evidence is
uniquely within the control of the defendant: the defendant
designates the place of the alibi. However, defenses based on the de-
fendant's mental condition pose similar problems for the prosecution
and, unlike the alibi defense, have generated a body of case law sup-
porting the discovery of unused defense evidence. In State v.
Dodis,233 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a court
rule which required a defendant who raised the defense of mental
illness to furnish the prosecution (subject to judicial screening for
relevance) "all medical reports and hospital and medical records pre-
viously or thereafter made concerning the mental condition of the
defendant .... ,,234 Under this provision, the medical expert ap-
pointed by the court to examine the defendant had access to all rele-
vant information on the defendant's prior history of mental illness -
an advantage not shared by examining psychiatrists in other jurisdic-
tions who must rely on what the defendant chooses to give them.235
The Minnesota provision permits the prosecution to "use" that infor-
mation to rebut the insanity defense.
236
The Dodis court interpreted the court rule to require defense dis-
closure, and permit prosecution use, of all medical examinations and
reports (not only pre-crime examinations for treatment purposes, but
also post-crime examinations arranged by defense counsel for litiga-
tion purposes). The court also held that the rule as applied did not
violate any constitutional right of the defendant but gave "the de-
fendant and prosecution as complete use of evidence as is possible
232. On cross-examination, the prosecution may ask the defendant to identify the
other poker players and explain why they were not called as defense witnesses. If the
defendant identifies the other players, the prosecution may call them as rebuttal wit-
nesses. Defendant's refusal to identify them surely would not be privileged but would
subject the defendant to adverse inferences, contempt sanctions, and perhaps even the
striking of the defendant's testimony. United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432 (9th Cir.
1980) (striking of defendant's testimony upheld when defendant improperly invoked priv-
ilege on stand).
233. 314 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1982).
234. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.03(1).
235. The information actually used by the prosecution in Dodis was the testimony
of a psychiatrist retained by defense counsel to examine the defendant prior to any court-
ordered examination. When the defendant decided not to call the psychiatrist (the de-
fendant presented only his own testimony in support of the mental illness defense), the
prosecution called him as a witness for the state.
236. Drafters' Comment, 49 MINN. STAT. ANN. 312 (1979) and 98-99 (1985
Supp.). Any reports or records produced by the defendant were admissible "only upon
the issue of the defense of mental illness." MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02(2).
237. The prosecution therefore had a right to call as its witness the psychiatrist
initially retained by defense counsel.
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under constitutional limitations to enhance the search for truth. ' 238
While the Dodis court's reasoning, especially on the constitutional
issue, is rather thin, the result reached seems correct. The prosecu-
tion's appropriation of unused defense evidence does not violate ei-
ther the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination or right to
the effective assistance of counsel. In Dodis, the court focused on the
latter right because the prosecution was not seeking the identity of
the defense psychiatrist; the defendant had already disclosed the psy-
chiatrist's identity, presumably when the court-appointed a psychia-
trist selected by the trial judge to examine the defendant and author-
ized the defense psychiatrist to observe that examination. 9 But the
reasoning adopted by Dodis for rejecting the defendant's right to
counsel claim applies equally as well to any self-incrimination claim.
In addition, the validity of any claim of privilege should not depend
on whether the defendant "voluntarily" disclosed the identity of the
defense-retained psychiatrist at some point in the process.
A number of courts have held that the attorney-client privilege
covers communications from a defendant to a psychiatrist retained
by the defendant's counsel to aid counsel in advising the client on
what defenses to raise.240 Other courts have chosen not to recognize
such a privilege 241 or, more commonly, have held that the defendant
waives the privilege in pleading insanity or presenting psychiatric ev-
idence. 42 A leading commentator has likewise argued against the
use of the privilege to suppress the results of a defense psychiatric
examination on the ground that results of such an examination are
likely to be more probative than the results of a court-ordered exam-
ination.243 Not only is the defendant likely to be more cooperative
238. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d at 241.
239. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02(2) (authorizing defense-retained psychiatrist to ob-
serve any court-ordered mental examination).
240. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); State v. Pratt, 284
Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979); State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957);
Pouncey v. State, 353 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Moore, 45 Or.
App. 837, 609 P.2d 866 (1980); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979).
241. State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1982); State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d
668 (Iowa 1984) (court emphasized public policy considerations favoring "full disclosure
of the facts"); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Texas Crim. App. 1976); People v.
Sorna, 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979).
242. People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 350 N.E.2d 400, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1976);
State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (court emphasized the need to
supply the fact-finder with every bit of available evidence touching the issue for it to
render an intelligent, fair and just verdict on the defendant's mental responsibility); State
v. Noggle, No. 3-78-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); see also Dodis, 314 N.W.2d at 240 (any
other result would suppress evidence the jury needs to know for just determination).
243. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L.
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with the defense psychiatrist, but that examination is likely to pre-
cede any court-ordered examination. Thus, the defense psychiatrist
has access to the defendant's mind closer in time to the crime and
before the defendant has had the benefit of a dry run of a prior
psychiatric examination. The fact-finder therefore should have access
to that information if the defendant puts his mental condition at
issue.
Courts that have addressed the constitutionality of so restricting
the attorney-client privilege have uniformly upheld its constitutional-
ity.244 The federal courts have emphasized the importance of al-
lowing the states to develop new approaches to testimonial privileges
and have refused to constitutionalize any particular version of the
attorney-client privilege.245 State courts, on the other hand, have em-
phasized policies of openness and fairness in holding that the effec-
tiveness of counsel does not depend on counsel's ability to shroud
investigations in secrecy.24 6
The right to effective counsel may require that defense counsel be
able to investigate possible defenses before committing the defendant
or to retain an undisclosed expert as an aide to the defense camp
rather than as a witness. Those techniques may be essential to the
effective functioning of defense counsel, but it is absurd to suggest
that counsel's effectiveness also depends on the ability to present a
defense witness without disclosing to the prosecution that several re-
jected defense witnesses would give less favorable testimony. At the
very least, courts should not strike down, as violating the defendant's
right to effective counsel, procedural rules requiring such disclosures.
The sixth amendmlent guarantees the defendant effective counsel
under existing rules and does not afford the defendant any right to
change the rules so that counsel can function more to the advantage
of the defense. 247 If the rules favor unfairly one side, that imbalance
poses due process problems but does not render counsel ineffective.
REv. 597, 634-42 (1980).
244. See cases cited supra notes 241-42; see also Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d
1408 (6th Cir. 1983) (denying habeas corpus relief to the defendant in State v. Noggle);
Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981) (denying habeas corpus relief to the
defendant in Granviel v. State); Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(Weinstein, J.), aJffd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977) (denying habeas corpus relief to de-
fendant in People v. Edney).
Two cases, United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975), and State v.
Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 519, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (1979), have suggested in dicta that the
attorney-client privilege, besides having a common-law basis, has acquired constitutional
significance.
245. See cases cited supra note 244, first paragraph.
246. State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668 (Iowa 1984); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d
54 (Mo. 1982) (en bane).
247. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978); Westen, Order of Proof:
An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1978).
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Dodis did not directly involve the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination because the prosecution did not need to ask the
defendant to produce any unused evidence. The prosecution already
had access to the defense psychiatrist. In State v. Carter,248 on the
other hand, the trial judge ordered the defendant to produce the re-
port of a psychiatrist employed by the defendant to examine the de-
fendant's mental condition at the time of the crime, but whom the
defendant had decided not to call in support of his insanity de-
fense.249 The defendant produced the report and the psychiatrist tes-
tified for the prosecution. The court upheld the trial judge's action
because the defendant had waived the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation when he pleaded insanity.
250
In Carter, the prosecution already knew the name of the defense
psychiatrist and only sought production of the report. Arguably, the
defendant's act of production was not testimonial because the exis-
tence and the defendant's possession of the report were foregone con-
clusions and because the psychiatrist could authenticate the report.
Most likely the prosecution could have obtained the report at trial,
but not during discovery, if it had simply subpoenaed the psychia-
trist to testify and to bring along the report.
The result, however, should be the same in cases in which the de-
fendant's disclosures are more helpful to the prosecution (that is,
where the prosecution does not know the identity of the defense psy-
chiatrist and the defendant in effect tells it: here is the name of a
psychiatrist who might help you). If pleading insanity makes unused
defense evidence on the defendant's mental condition available to the
prosecution, it should do so in all cases and not just where the de-
fendant is sufficiently unlucky or poor to be unable to conceal from
the prosecution the identity of a defense psychiatrist. Wealthy de-
fendants may shop at their leisure for favorable psychiatric testi-
mony without attracting the prosecutor's attention; poor defendants
do not enjoy that benefit because they must seek court orders to pay
248. 641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
249. The trial judge acted under a court rule which authorized him, at the request
of the prosecution, to order the defendant to produce material and information, in addi-
tion to what the defendant intended to introduce as evidence, if the request was reasona-
ble and information sought was material to the prosecutor's case. Mo. R. CRIM. P.
25.05(a)(1).
250. Arguably, the waiver took place only when the defendant presented evidence
in support of an insanity defense. But the plea of insanity at least bespeaks an intent to
present evidence on the defense; and if the defendant presents no evidence, the prosecu-
tion has no further need of its discovery because the issue of insanity will no longer be in
the case and the prosecution can rely on the presumption of sanity.
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their psychiatrists and, if incarcerated before trial, must arrange
with their jail wardens for scheduling pretrial mental examinations.
In those cases the prosecution will have no difficulty discovering "in-
dependently" the identity of the defense psychiatrist; and there is
little the defendant can do to avoid making the desired disclosure.
Formal discovery rules simply require wealthy defendants to do the
same thing.
The disclosure required of defendants who raise an insanity or re-
lated defense therefore need not be limited to the evidence they in-
tend to produce at trial. By putting in issue their mental condition
defendants waive any physician-patient privilege applicable to prior
communications to treating physicians. 51 They are no longer able to
insist on the privacy of those relationships;252 and the prosecution
may contact those physicians and use them as witnesses. A growing
body of case law also permits the prosecution to do the same thing
with respect to nontreating physicians retained by defense counsel to
examine the defendant. In neither case should the privilege against
self-incrimination bar prosecutorial discovery of the physicians and
their reports, although the authority to support this last proposition
is not as clear as it might be with respect to the discovery of treating
or examining physicians unknown to the prosecution.
The work product privilege also should not bar prosecutorial dis-
covery of the identity and reports of examining psychiatrists, but the
result may be different for the reports of other experts retained by
the defense. The report and trial testimony of a defense-retained psy-
chiatrist is in many if not most cases unique. The prosecution cannot
duplicate it by retaining its own expert or a neutral expert. Even if
the prosecution obtains a court order for a mental examination of
the defendant, the defendant may not be as cooperative with the
court-appointed psychiatrist as he was with the defense psychiatrist;
and, if the examination by the defense psychiatrist preceded the
court-ordered examination, as is likely to be the case, the defense
psychiatrist will have had access to information unavailable to subse-
quent examiners who will encounter a mind more removed in time
from the crime and affected, if not primed, by the earlier examina-
tion. The case for prosecutorial discovery thus depends in large part
on the uniqueness of the defense psychiatrist's report. If it were not
unique, and the prosecution could simply duplicate it, then the un-
used defense expert should constitute protected work product. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, permit discovery of a
251. State v. Cole, 295 N.W.2d 29, 33-36 (Iowa 1980); People v. Edney, 39
N.Y.2d 620, 350 N.E.2d 400, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1975); Bailey v. State, 264 Ind. 505,
346 N.E.2d 741 (1976); State v. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d 503, 504-06 (La. 1978).
252. Saltzburg, supra note 243, at 634.
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party's unused experts only in "exceptional circumstances. 2 53 The
philosophy of the rules is that the opposing party does not need dis-
covery to prepare to cross-examine the nonappearing expert and
should employ its own expert rather than use its adversary's.
This same work product protection should normally apply in crim-
inal cases. Thus, the prosecution should not be able to obtain discov-
ery of the report of a handwriting analyst retained by the defendant,
but not called because the expert had concluded that the offender's
and the defendant's handwriting were the same. At least if both ex-
emplars are still available, the prosecution should retain its own ex-
pert. The prosecution therefore does not have the same need to dis-
cover the report of the defense handwriting expert as it does the
report of the defense psychiatrist. Work product protection for the
unused defense handwriting expert therefore seems appropriate even
at trial.2 54 The prosecution can adequately test defense evidence by
cross-examining the defendant's expert and by retaining its own ex-
pert to repeat the test.
Considering that the work product doctrine is subject to legislative
and judicial modification, one might ask why a state could not
change the rules to require defendants who present the testimony of
a handwriting expert to disclose what other handwriting experts they
have retained. The work product doctrine protects the lawyer and
not the client. It is hard to fathom how depriving counsel of that
litigation advantage renders counsel ineffective.255 Perhaps, however,
defendants may claim their own privilege against self-incrimination
when asked to produce an unused handwriting expert's report be-
cause the prosecution does not need the defendant's help (that is, the
implied statement that here is a handwriting expert who may help
you destroy my evidence) in order adequately to test the evidence
presented.
Conclusion
Prosecutorial discovery of defense information in addition to what
the defendant intends to present at trial therefore appears to be le-
253. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
254. Mingo v. State, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978). Mingo also held that
prosecutorial discovery of the defendant's unused handwriting expert violated the defend-
ant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. The court found that violation, as well as
the work product violation, to be harmless error.
255. See generally Feldman, The Work Product Rule in Criminal Practice and
Procedure, 50 U. IN. L. REV. 495 (1981). The constitutional basis for Mingo's holding
therefore seems questionable.
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gitimate, although it remains unclear how far one can generalize
from the availability of such discovery in the four areas described
above. To permit further development, states might consider adopt-
ing a court rule authorizing the prosecution to request discovery of
specific information needed to test evidence which the defendant has
chosen to present.2 56 When the prosecution requests discovery under
such a rule, the court must ensure that the defendant has access to
reciprocal discovery as required by due process. The reciprocity re-
quirement may bar this broadened prosecutorial discovery unless de-
fendants may obtain the discovery they need adequately to test the
prosecution's evidence. Thus, it does not seem sufficient that court
rules require, as is often the case, that the prosecution disclose its
evidence plus any exculpatory material.257 The rules should also re-
quire the prosecution to disclose the identity of all persons with
knowledge of relevant facts and all relevant documents and tangible
things.258 In other words, the prosecutor's "factual" file must be
open to the defense. The prosecutor's due process obligation to dis-
close exculpatory material is no substitute for this broadened defense
discovery because at the pretrial stage the prosecutor has no way of
reliably knowing what unused information in the file might be excul-
patory,25 19 much less what information might assist the defendant to
test the prosecution's evidence.
THE CASE FOR BROADER PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY OF
DOCUMENTS AND TANGIBLE THINGS TO STRENGTHEN THE
PROSECUTION'S CASE
Prosecutorial Discovery Without Formal Discovery Rules
Most prosecutorial discovery occurs, as it should, before the com-
mencement of any adversary judicial proceeding. The prosecution,
unlike a private litigant, enjoys coercive investigatory powers which
permit it to gather evidence in advance of filing suit. The most im-
portant of these powers is the making of reasonable searches and
seizures to obtain evidence of a suspect's guilt. The prosecution also
normally has access to grand jury or other investigatory subpoenas
for compelling testimony and the production of documents or tangi-
ble things.
256. See discussion of Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.05(a)(1) supra note 244.
257. See, e.g., MD. R. 4-263. Court rules often permit in addition defense discov-
ery of all items in the possession of the prosecution which belong to the defendant -
evidently on the theory that the prosecution's possession of these items would otherwise
render them inaccessible to the defendant. Id. R. 4-263(b)(6) (defense discovery of all
property of defendant in possession of state); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C)(same).
258. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.200(A)(i) (defense discovery of all persons with
knowledge of relevant facts).
259. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of
Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 396-97
(1984).
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The rights guaranteed all persons by the fourth and fifth amend-
ments limit the prosecution's precharge investigatory powers. For
many searches (for example, searches of dwellings or containers and
searches for conversations), the prosecution must convince a neutral
and detached magistrate that it has sufficient cause, normally proba-
ble cause, to justify the intrusion. 2 0 The warrant issued by the mag-
istrate must particularly describe the place or person to be searched
and the things to be seized.261
The requirements of probable cause and particularity do not apply
- at least with the same vigor - to investigatory subpoenas. The
prosecution need only establish that the demand of the grand jury or
other investigatory authority for documents or tangible things is a
reasonable one.262 While the investigatory subpoena, unlike a war-
rant, escapes most fourth amendment limitations, grand juries and
other investigatory bodies cannot compel incriminating testimony,
including acts of testimonial production, from witnesses appearing
before them.
263
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, on the
other hand, does not preclude an investigatory seizure of testimonial
evidence (for example, a suspect's papers264 or verbal utterances265),
so long as the prosecution does not compel the suspect to write or say
anything. The fifth amendment poses no barrier to the otherwise
lawful seizure of incriminating records, including records in the sus-
pect's own handwriting, because the officers executing the seizure do
all the work themselves without any help from the suspect. Thus, in
the case of a seizure, as opposed to that of a subpoena, there is no
compelled act of testimonial production because "the individual
against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the
discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating
260. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (dwelling searches); Chadwick v.
United States, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (container searches); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) (searches for conversations). Warrants are not necessary for automobile
searches, Ross v. United States, 456 U.S. 798 (1981), or for searches of arrestees. Robin-
son v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1974).
261. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
262. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (grand jury subpoena for hand-
writing exemplar); Oklahoma Press v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (administrative sub-
poena for documents).
263. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (IRS investigatory subpoena);
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (grand jury subpoena).
264. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); see also United States v. Ben-
nett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.) (seizure of personal diary upheld).
265. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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evidence." '
To obtain a warrant to search for and seize evidence, the prosecu-
tion must describe with particularity the things to be seized and es-
tablish that it is probable that the things are connected with criminal
activity and are to be found in the place to be searched.267 With
respect to the particularity of the description, courts are lenient and
require little more than the police do the best they can in describing
the items to be seized. 268 The nexus requirement also poses few prac-
tical problems once the police connect the possessor of the "thing to
be seized" with a crime.
The location requirement, on the other hand, serves as a signifi-
cant barrier to a successful search even in those cases where the po-
lice have identified or arrested a suspected offender. Any probable
cause the police have with respect to the location of the thing may
quickly become stale.2 9 As a practical matter, a suspect seeking to
avoid detection is likely to keep incriminating items in places where
law enforcement authorities would least expect to find them. Thus, a
warrant authorizing the search of more likely locations may not lead
to the seizure of incriminating evidence. It is nevertheless simply not
reasonable to permit the police to search every place to which the
suspect has had access since the time of the crime.
The prosecution oftens seeks to overcome the uncertainty of the
location of seizable evidence by obtaining a subpoena compelling
production of the evidence by the person believed to be in possession.
Of course, subpoenas directed to the suspect under investigation may
prompt a claim of privilege. Fisher1 ° has spawned considerable con-
fusion in the lower courts on what acts of testimonial production the
privilege protects. 271 Professor Heidt has argued that the courts
should interpret Fisher to bar only "rocking-chair" subpoenas order-
ing the production of contraband or stolen goods.2 72 In these situa-
tions, the production of the thing subpoenaed is an implied admission
of an element of an offense (that is, the possession of contraband or
266. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 474.
267. 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.4(0, at 227 (1985).
268. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 4.6 (1978 & 1985 Supp.) (collecting
cases). In Andresen itself, the Court upheld a warrant which, after listing numerous
specific items, contained a catch-all phrase authorizing the seizure of "all other fruits,
instrumentalities, and evidence" of the false pretenses offense under investigation. The
Court noted that the offense involved a complex real estate scheme which th state could
prove only by piecing together "many pieces of evidence that, taken singly, would show
comparatively little." Andresen, 427 U.S. at 281 n.10. It was therefore not reasonable to
expect the prosecution to describe in advance each little piece of evidence it needed.
269. See, e.g., Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932) (no probable cause to
search hotel for intoxicants when affidavit established their presence three weeks earlier).
270. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
271. Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents - Cutting Fisher's
Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 473-82 (1985).
272. Id. at 489-91.
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stolen goods). Professor Heidt argues that in all other situations
compelling from the subpoena recipient implied admissions on the
existence, possession and authenticity of documents and tangible
things does not sufficiently aid the prosecution to offend the policies
behind the privilege of maintaining a fair state-individual balance
and of protecting human dignity.21 3 This analysis is questionable be-
cause, as the courts recognize,2 74 there are situations where a sus-
pect's admission of the noncriminal possession of a document or
weapon may be very useful to the prosecution, although not in itself
sufficient, in establishing an element of an offense (for example,
knowledge of fraud disclosed in a document or access to a weapon
used in a crime).
2 75
Prosecutors have had greater success with subpoenas directed at
nonsuspects. The privilege against self-incrimination is personal; and
the recipient of a subpoena cannot claim that production of the items
requested would incriminate someone else.2 76 Still more important,
persons who fear incrimination cannot intervene or otherwise prevent
the recipient from producing the documents or things subpoenaed,
even if they own the items and the producer holds them as their
agent.? Thus, offenders who allow others to exercise control over
incriminating evidence cannot complain if the prosecution compels
those nonsuspects to produce it. Suspects can only complain about
compulsion directed at themselves.
One exception to this generalization - an exception not based on
the fifth amendment privilege - protects documents, and perhaps
tangible things, entrusted to an attorney for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice, Fisher held that, although the suspect's attorney could
not raise the client's fifth amendment privilege as the privilege was
personal to the client,2 78 counsel could, and indeed must, raise the
attorney-client privilege to refuse the production of documents that
the client could refuse to produce if the client had retained posses-
sion of them. The Court reasoned that the client would not make full
273. Id. at 489.
274. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir.
1983) (implied admission of possession helps prosecution establish guilty knowledge of
possessor).
275. For a similar analysis of testimonial production, see Organizational Papers
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640, 646 n.46, 650 n.68
(1986).
276. United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
277. Id. (taxpayer cannot stop his accountant from producing taxpayer's records);
Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
278. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 396-401.
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disclosure by entrusting privileged documents to the attorney if by so
doing the documents became available to the government. 7 9 Fisher
thus protects from discovery documents in the possession of the at-
torney if the government could not have compelled the client to pro-
duce them and if the client transferred them to the attorney for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice. The basis for this protection, how-
ever, is the federal common law attorney-client privilege28 and not
the client's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The
states and Congress, as well as the Supreme Court in its rule-making
capacity, may choose to define the attorney-client privilege more
narrowly so as not to protect documents or other physical evidence
transferred to the attorney.8"
State courts, like the Fisher Court, have treated the attorney-cli-
ent privilege as a limitation on prosecutorial discovery from defense
counsel. Unlike Fisher, state courts have not interpreted the privilege
to protect physical evidence received by the attorney from the cli-
ent.282 This limitation on the privilege has, unfortunately, received
less popular attention than a related, expansive interpretation which
requires the attorney to suppress information detrimental to the cli-
ent. Under that interpretation, the privilege covers not only confiden-
tial communications from the client to the attorney on the location
of incriminating evidence, but also information acquired by the at-
torney or a defense investigator directly as a result of those
communications.28 3
279. Id. at 403.
280. FED. R. EvID. 501 provides that privileges in the federal courts "shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in light of reason and experience." The Court plainly decided Fisher (a
federal case) under that rule.
281. Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1978) (California
courts may reject Fisher holding on attorney-client privilege).
282. See infra text accompanying notes 288-306.
283. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, § 89; People v. Meredith, 29 Cal.
3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981); State v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 770
(1882). The privilege, for example, protects not only the client's admission that he mur-
dered A and buried the body in location B, but also the attorney's personal observation of
the burial site confirming those admissions. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372
N.Y.S.2d 798, affid, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975) (Lake Pleasant bodies
case). This extension of the privilege to cover the observations of the attorney has pro-
voked considerable controversy - as demonstrated by the public debate following the
client's (not the attorneys') eventual disclosing of the location of the bodies in the Lake
Pleasant case. The Beige court itself, while holding that the attorney-client privilege
shielded the attorneys from liability under the Public Health Law for failing to properly
bury the bodies, did indicate in dicta that the result might have been different if the state
had asserted less "trivial" interests and charged the attorneys with obstructing justice. 83
Misc. 2d at 191, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
Professor Saltzburg has argued more generally that the privilege should not cover
counsel's observations - including observations of evidence shown in confidence by the
client. He argues that the attorney should be available to the prosecution as a witness if
no other witness (excluding of course the defendant) can provide that testimony. The
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This expansive interpretation of the privilege only protects com-
munications from the client; and it is now clear that if a third party
presents incriminating evidence to the attorney (for example, the cli-
ent's weapon or bloody clothes), the attorney must either advise the
third party to present the evidence to the prosecution or, if the attor-
ney takes delivery of the evidence, must turn it over to the prosecu-
tion within a reasonable period of time.284 The attorney must do the
same if a defense investigator takes possession of incriminating evi-
dence discovered by the investigator.28 5 Accepting and keeping the
evidence without disclosing it is unethical286 and may violate crimi-
nal statutes punishing the obstruction of justice.2 87 Lawyers have in
fact become quite sensitive about the ethical obligations imposed on
the receipt of incriminating evidence, and many believe that the saf-
est course is simply to refuse to accept it.288 Unfortunately, that so-
lution is not always appropriate because at the time the evidence
becomes available defense counsel may not know whether the evi-
dence might be useful in some way in preparing the defense. More
importantly, if defense counsel does not accept it, the evidence may
be destroyed to the detriment of the defendant.
The situation is only slightly different if the client presents eviden-
attorney-client privilege should not give the client a monopoly on the lawyer as a poten-
tial witness. If the prosecution can show a real need for the attorney's testimony (i.e.,
overcome the work product doctrine), that testimony should be available to it. Saltzburg,
Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IowA L. REV. 811,
829-37 (1981).
284. Hitch v. Superior Court, 146 Ariz. 588, 708 P.2d 72 (1985); Morrell v. State,
575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978); People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715
(1970); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970).
285. Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985); People v. Meredith, 29
Cal. 3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981).
286. California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Opinion 1984-76 (1984); Arizona State Bar Ass'n, Ethical Opinion 85-4
(1984).
287. Obstruction of justice statutes normally punish the suppression or destruction
of evidence knowing that it may be useful in a judicial proceeding or is being sought by
official investigators. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 558 (3d ed. 1982). The
Alaska statute before the court in Morrell punished the concealment of evidence "being
sought for production during an investigation, inquiry or trial, with the intent to prevent
the evidence from being discovered or produced." Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1212. The Mor-
rell court, in dicta (the attorney had in fact surrendered the evidence which the prosecu-
tion then used to convict the client), reasoned that an attorney's "taking possession of
evidence from a non-client third party and holding the evidence in a place not accessible
to investigating authorities would seem to fall within the statute's ambit." Id.
288. ABA Criminal Justice Section Ethics Committee, Ethical Standard to Guide
a Lawyer Who Receives Physical Evidence Implicating His Client in Criminal Conduct,
29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2465-6 (1981); Maine Bar Ass'n, Professional Ethics Commis-
sion Opinion 60 (1985).
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tiary items to the attorney. In the lead case of State ex rel. Sowers
v. Olwell,2 9 a coroner subpoenaed an attorney representing a mur-
der defendant to produce all knives in his possession "relating to"
the client. The attorney refused to comply on the ground that any
knives in his possession he had received in confidence from the client.
The Olwell court reversed the attorney's contempt conviction be-
cause it found that the subpoena required "the attorney to give testi-
mony concerning information received by him from his client in the
course of their conferences." 290 Thus, although the Qiwell court did
not say it quite so clearly, the coroner could not compel the attorney
to testify as to the client's communication to him that "here is my
knife. '291 The attorney-client privilege therefore prevailed, in the
court's opinion, "against the public's interest in the criminal investi-
gation process.
29 2
The Qlwell court recognized, however, that the attorney-client
privilege did not protect the knife itself,293 and did not permit the
attorney to withhold it permanently. Even if the client gave the at-
torney the knife to obtain legal advice and not just to take it out of
circulation, the attorney could only retain it for a "reasonable period
of time" (presumably the time needed to do any testing or investiga-
tion indicated by the circumstances) and then must on his own mo-
tion turn it over to the prosecution. 294 The Olwell court rather
loosely based the attorney's duty to disclose on his status as an "of-
ficer of the court. '29 5 It would seem preferable to hold that the attor-
ney's permanently taking the knife out of circulation would consti-
tute an obstruction of justice.29 18 The attorney's failure to disclose
would therefore constitute a crime, thus imposing on the attorney an
289. 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964).
290. Id. at 833, 394 P.2d at 684.
291. When the client transferred the knife to the attorney, the communication that
"here is my knife" implicitly occurred. Subpoenaing the attorney to produce the client's
knife would in effect require him to disclose that communication because presumably he
knew the knife was his client's knife because his client had told him so. As stated by the
Michigan Court of Appeals, permitting the prosecution to show that the defendant's at-
torney had such evidence in his possession impermissibly "invites the jury to infer that
defendant gave the evidence to her attorney." People v. Nash, 110 Mich. App. 428, 447,
313 N.W.2d 307, 314 (1981).
292. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d at 832, 394 P.2d at 684.
293. The prosecution presumably could seize the knife from the lawyer's office
under a warrant. Mehrens v. State, 138 Ariz. 458, 675 P.2d 718 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)
(seizure of letters given to attorney by client). But see O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d
400 (Minn. 1979) (search of offices of nonsuspect attorneys presumptively unreasonable).
The O'Connor court favored the use of subpoenas to obtain evidence from nonsuspect
attorneys, but in Mehrens the attorney had successfully resisted a subpoena for the let-
ters by invoking the attorney-client privilege a la Fisher. See State ex rel. Hyder v.
Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 253, 625 P.2d 316 (1981).
294. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d at 834, 394 P.2d at 684.
295. Id. at 833, 394 P.2d at 684.
296. See the Morrell court analysis discussed supra note 287.
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ethical obligation to disclose.
2 97
The Ciwell court concluded that, once the prosecution obtained
the knife, it could use it to secure a conviction of the defendant. In
dicta, the court warned the prosecutor not to disclose to the fact-
finder the "source" of the evidence. 98 Informing the jury of the at-
torney's production of the knife would in effect ask them to infer
that the knife came from the defendant. 9 The limited exclusionary
rule fashioned by the Olwell court thus protects the defendant's at-
torney-client privilege by barring the use at trial of any privileged
communication.
Authenticating the knife without the defendant's help may prove
to be a difficult task.300 The prosecution therefore receives less bene-
fit from the knife when produced by defense counsel than if the pros-
ecution had obtained the knife by seizure from the defendant's per-
son or home.3 1 The concern that a criminal defendant might
"launder" incriminating evidence by delivering it to the prosecutor
with the help of counsel, thus making it less useful to the prosecu-
tion, has persuaded Professor Saltzburg to oppose the limited exclu-
sionary rule fashioned by the Olwell court.30 2 His proposed remedy
of allowing the prosecutor to disclose to the jury the source of the
evidence seems unwarranted. Encouraging or permitting laundering
is acceptable because it gives the prosecution some evidence when
otherwise it might obtain none. Ordinarily the prosecution will have
had some time span during which the evidence was subject to seizure
from defendant's possession before defense counsel obtained custody
of it; and the defendant was able to give it to defense counsel only
because the prosecution was unable to obtain it by seizure. In addi-
297. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-27 (1970) (attor-
ney shall not suppress evidence he is legally obligated to reveal).
298. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d at 834. 394 P.2d at 685. What the court evidently meant
to say is that the prosecution must authenticate the knife as the defendant's knife other
than through the defendant's communication of that fact to his attorney.
299. Nash, 110 Mich. App. at 447, 313 N.W.2d at 314 (following Olwell).
300. For a case where the prosecution was able to authenticate a weapon, see
United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1979) (in response to subpoena
defense counsel produced the defendant's brass knuckles which other witnesses
authenticated).
301. In Hitch, 146 Ariz. at 595, 708 P.2d at 79, the court fashioned a similar rule
precluding any mention to the jury of the fact that defendant's counsel was the source of
incriminating evidence. In that case defense counsel did not obtain the evidence from his
client. The basis for the exclusionary rule was not the protection of the privileged com-
munication but the protection of defendant's right to counsel of his choice (i.e., to pre-
vent counsel's disqualification through his testifying against his client).
302. Saltzburg, Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
IOWA L. REV. 811, 838 (1981).
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tion, the defendant's main concern in transferring incriminating evi-
dence to counsel may not be to launder the evidence - it would be
far sharper to destroy it - but to see if counsel might use the evi-
dence to provide a defense or at least to mitigate guilt. It is too high
a price to exact from the defendant's confiding in counsel to permit
the prosecution not only to use the evidence against the defendant
but also to use the defendant's communications to counsel about the
evidence.
Other state courts have followed Ciwell in requiring defense coun-
sel to afford discovery to the prosecution of incriminating evidence
furnished by the defendant. 30 3 Even Fisher cited Olwell approvingly,
albeit for an uncontroversial point that Qiwell did not even ad-
dress.30 4 The reconciliation of these state cases and Fisher is never-
theless not an easy matter. Olwell seems to present a classic fact
pattern of evidence which the fifth amendment privilege protects the
client from producing and which the attorney-client privilege, as
construed in Fisher, prevents the attorney from producing after the
client transfers the evidence to the attorney for the purpose of ob-
taining legal advice. Commonwealth v. Hughes305 squarely held that
the privilege barred compelling a defendant to produce a weapon
suspected to be the weapon used to commit the offense charged. Yet
Qiwell and its progeny hold that the attorney-client privilege does
not bar counsel from producing the weapon and thus afford useful
discovery to the state.
The most likely explanation for this seeming discrepancy - if one
tries to reconcile the cases rather than simply conclude that state
courts have interpreted the state-law attorney-client privilege to be
narrower than the federal one - is that the subpoena in Fisher re-
quired the attorney to produce the documents which the taxpayer
had given him. 30 6 The subpoena was therefore similar to the sub-
poena condemned in Olwell because it in effect required the attorney
to produce the knife given him by the client. Fisher, unlike Olwell,
simply did not address whether the privilege protected the docu-
ments themselves (that is, whether the government could obtain
them by otherwise describing them in the subpoena or by seizing
303. Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d 871, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); People v.
Nash, 110 Mich. App. 428, 313 N.W.2d 307 (1981); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200,
1211 n.17 (Alaska 1978) (dictum).
304. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 404. Fisher cited Ciwell for the proposition that preexist-
ing documents obtainable from the client when the client was in possession are also ob-
tainable from the attorney after transfer. Ciwell plainly does not support or even mention
that proposition. It is doubtful that any of the Justices read the Washington Supreme
Court's opinion.
305. 380 Mass. 596, 404 N.E.2d 1246 (1980). For a discussion of Hughes, see
supra text accompanying notes 81-97.
306. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 393.
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them under a warrant or whether it would be permissible to impose
on counsel a duty to turn them over to the government).
Perhaps Fisher did not address these issues because Fisher in-
volved documents rather than physical evidence. The Olwell court
had expressed concern about an attorney becoming "a depository for
criminal evidence (such as a knife, other weapons, stolen property,
etc.), - which in itself has little, if any, material value for the pur-
poses of aiding counsel in the preparation of the defense of his cli-
ent's case. '30 7 Documents do not fit that description; and lawyers
plainly feel more comfortable accepting their clients' incriminating
documents than accepting incriminating physical evidence. Perhaps
the explanation for this phenomenon is that there is a far greater
danger of subterfuge when incriminating physical evidence is in-
volved.308 Rarely will there be a genuine need for the lawyer to have
access to the evidence to prepare for trial. In white collar criminal
cases, on the other hand, it is commonplace for defense counsel -
both pre- and postcharge - to review, for purposes of preparing a
defense, documents submitted by the client. Thus, it remains unclear
whether Ciwell's dicta on the attorney's duty to produce evidence
obtained from the client applies to documents; but it is reasonably
clear that Fisher's interpretation of the attorney-client privilege
should not bar the federal courts from requiring what Ciwell re-
quired (that is, the attorney's production of a weapon or other physi-
cal evidence obtained from the client).
A Proposed Discovery Rule
Present law, as described in the prior section, already affords the
prosecution considerable discovery from the defendant and defense
counsel of documents or tangible things useful to the prosecution's
case. This discovery does not take place under formal discovery rules
but has as its basis the coercive investigatory power of the state and
the ethical obligations of defense counsel. This limited discovery does
not help the prosecution in cases like Commonwealth v. Hughes
where the defendant, rather than confiding with counsel incriminat-
ing evidence which the state has a right to seize, keeps or conceals it
where the prosecution cannot find it. When discussing Hughes, it
was argued that the prosecution should be able through discovery to
307. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d at 833. 394 P.2d at 684.
308. See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967) (a well-known case in
which the court disciplined an attorney for retaining a shotgun and stolen goods received
from his client).
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enforce its right of access to Hughes's weapon so long as the prose-
cution did not use any testimony compelled from Hughes. Ciwell
and its progeny, as well as the growing body of law on use immunity,
suggests how that might be accomplished.
The proposed mechanism is a court rule authorizing prosecutorial
discovery from the defendant of documents or tangible things if the
prosecution (i) specifically requests their production; (ii) describes
the documents or things with sufficient particularity to satisfy fourth
amendment requirements; and (iii) establishes probable cause to
connect the documents or things to the crime charged. The rule
would apply only to evidentiary items and not to items such as con-
traband or stolen goods whose possession is an element of the crime
charged. In addition, the rule would prohibit the prosecution from
disclosing to the jury or other fact-finder the source of the evidence
produced.
This limitation on the use of the defendant's act of production,
in addition to protecting the defendant's privilege against self-in-
crimination, should deter prosecutorial overreliance on postcharge
discovery to bolster an otherwise weak case. The prosecution should
obtain incriminating evidence by precharge search and seizure when-
ever possible. The proposed rule provides the prosecution an incen-
tive to do so because seized evidence is more useful. The seizure
serves to authenticate the evidence and may connect it with the de-
fendant. Similarly, the proposed rule does not permit the prosecution
to rely on postcharge discovery to obtain evidence as crucial as con-
traband or stolen goods.
Because there is no precedent for this rule, its constitutionality is
of course open to question. The chief basis for constitutional attack
is the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The basic ar-
gument for the rule's constitutionality is that the rule does not vio-
late the policies behind the privilege by skewing the criminal process
in the prosecution's favor or by permitting the prosecution unfairly
use the defendant in securing a conviction. In fact, the rule helps the
prosecution to rectify an imbalance in the defendant's favor.
The proposed discovery rule allows the state to enforce its right of
access against defendants who have succeeded in concealing from
the state evidence which the state has a right to seize. The help given
the state by the defendant is slight: defendants must afford the pros-
ecution access to seizable evidence rather than continue to keep hid-
den what they know the prosecution is seeking. The aid for the pros-
ecution's case comes primarily from the evidence itself and not the
defendant's production of it. It is hard to see how compelling the
defendant to make seizable evidence accessible to the prosecution
adversely impacts a fair state-individual balance or violates human
dignity any more than compelling a defendant to produce a blood
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sample or voice or handwriting exemplars.
Of course, the proposed rule does compel a potentially incriminat-
ing communication from the defendant. If the defendant has the
item sought in the prosecution's discovery request, the defendant
must testify: "I have the item of evidence you wish. Here it is."
Thus, while only the common-law attorney-client privilege protects
the client's admissions to his counsel, including an admission that
"Here is my gun," the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion applies directly when the prosecution compels this" form of dis-
covery from the defendant.
The appropriate protection, however, is the same in both situations
(that is, to bar any prosecutorial use of privileged communications).
The Court has upheld the compulsion of incriminating testimony
upon a grant of use immunity shielding the defendant from any use
or derivative use of the compelled testimony. 309 In the context of
compelled acts of testimonial production, the Court has made it crys-
tal clear that the incriminating contents of the documents or things
produced do not fall within the scope of the compelled testimony.310
The compelled testimony, which the state must immunize if it is in-
criminating, are the implied admissions by the producer on exis-
tence, possession and authenticity.311 Barring the prosecutor from
making any reference to the source that produced the document or
thing will effectively immunize that testimony. Of course, use immu-
nity bars derivative as well as direct uses of immunized testimony,312
and the prosecution may need to show that it did not use any acts of
testimonial production as leads to secure other evidence. While this
task of negating any derivative use is often a difficult one when the
immunized testimony occurs before trial and covers a broad range of
topics, it should prove less difficult when the immunized testimony is
very narrow and occurs after the prosecution has prepared its own
case.313
309. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
310. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1984).
311. In Doe, the Court flatly rejected the argument that any grant of use immu-
nity must cover the contents of the documents as well as the act of production. The
Court responded that, since the privilege extended only to the act of production, "any
grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that
might accompany the act of producing his business records." Id. at 617 n.17 (1984).
312. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
313. Professor Subin's contrary argument that the prosecution's use of the contents
of the documents or physical evidence produced is a forbidden derivative use of com-
pelled testimony is difficult to accept in light of Doe's footnote 17 - an authority not
cited by Professor Subin in his otherwise excellent article. See Subin, The Lawyer as
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The effect of the proposed rule on attorney-client relations is also
an open question. At present, counsel should warn clients, before ac-
cepting possession of physical evidence, that it may be necessary to
disclose the evidence to the prosecution.3 1 4 Under the proposed rule,
defense counsel must instruct clients that, if the client becomes or is
a criminal defendant, the client has a duty to produce documents or
physical evidence in their possession or control if that evidence falls
within the provisions of the rule. Counsel's policing of the client's
obligation to produce evidence will certainly produce some tension in
the relationship, but not nearly so much tension as created by coun-
sel's ethical obligation to prevent client perjury.315 If counsel believes
that a client is concealing documents or tangible things in defiance
of a discovery order, counsel must seek to persuade the client to
comply with the law or, if unable to do so, withdraw from the case.
Unlike in the case of perjured testimony, the above conflict is likely
to arise before trial at a time when counsel can withdraw from the
case without disclosing to the trial judge the basis for withdrawal.
The chief objection to the proposed rule may in fact be its limited
impact. It must be admitted that there is an element of unreality in
the rule's assumption that criminal defendants will meekly produce
evidence that the prosecution will then use to convict them. Defend-
ants may respond to discovery requests by denying that they possess
or control the requested evidence. Some, if not most, criminal de-
fendants will lie both to their counsel and the court, even though the
latter misrepresentation may subject them to the penalties of perjury
or false statement.16
Despite the limited efficacy of the rule and its potential for gener-
ating attorney-client conflict, the proposed rule does present a major
advantage by refocusing the debate on defense suppression of evi-
dence. So far, the debate has focused on the ethical obligations of
counsel. The question asked is when must counsel squeal on the cli-
ent by disclosing documents or tangible things helpful to the prose-
cution. The response given is that attorneys must squeal only if they
take possession of physical evidence. Such a response naturally dis-
courages receipt of evidence even if it also may be useful to the de-
Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091,
1124-25 n.185 (1985). Professor Subin does acknowledge that the scope of the necessary
immunity is "open to question." Id.
314. California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Opinion 1984-76 (1984).
315. See Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (defendant's right to effective
representation does not require defense counsel to present perjured testimony). For an
examination of the tension, and confusion, created by counsel's ethical obligation to pre-
vent client perjury, see Auerbach, What Are Law Clerks For? - Comments On Nix v.
Whiteside, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 979 (1986).
316. A grant of immunity need not confer immunity for perjury or false statement.
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
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fense. The proposed rule answers a different, more relevant question:
what are the constitutional limits for imposing discovery obligations
directly on the defendant. The question is more relevant because, if
we want to afford the prosecution access to incriminating evidence,
we should not expect defense counsel to squeal, but should expect
the defendant-client to produce it. In other words, the preferable re-
sponse to the danger of suppression of evidence is not to impose ethi-
cal obligations on defense counsel but to impose discovery obligations
on the defendant. Defense counsel will then have an ethical obliga-
tion to enforce discovery orders.3 1. Such an approach allows counsel
to tell the client what the law requires the client to do and should
produce a healthier attorney-client relationship in the long run.
317. Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921,
933.
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